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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to study through four essays the economics of migration from
developing countries. The rst chapter assesses the e¤ect of natural disasters (mainly due
to climate change), in developing countries, on migration rates and looks at how this e¤ect
varies according to the level of education of people. Our results show that natural disasters
are positively associated with emigration rates and also involve the migration of highly
skilled people. The second chapter presents the di¤erent channels explaining the intention
to migrate illegally. One of the novelties of the analysis is that it uses a tailor-made survey
among urban Senegalese individuals. We nd that potential illegal migrants are willing
to accept a substantial risk of death and tend to be young, single and with a low level
of education. We also show that the price of illegal migration, migrant networks, high
expectations, tight immigration policies and the preferred destination country all play a
role in the willingness to migrate illegally. The third chapter completes the second one
by studying the role of risk-aversion and discount rate in illegal migration from Senegal.
Our results show that these individual preferences matter in the willingness to migrate
illegally and to pay a smuggler. Finally in the fourth chapter, we are interested in the
e¤ect of migrants on credit markets in a rural Senegalese context. According to our
results, having a migrant in a household increases both the likelihood of having a loan
and its size, whether the loan is formal or informal. We also nd that this positive e¤ect
remains signicant no matter if the loan is taken for professional activities or simply to
buy food.
Keywords: Migration; Climate change; Natural disasters; Senegal; Illegal migration;
Intentions, Risk-aversion; Discount rate; Credit markets.
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1General Introduction
In this thesis, we are interested in the economics of migration from developing countries
both from a macroeconomic and a microeconomic perspective. First, we investigate the
relationship between natural disasters, mainly due to climate change, and migration by
using panel data from developing countries. Second, we use a unique data set on potential
migrants collected from urban Senegal to explain the economics of illegal migration. Third,
we complete the previous study by analyzing the role of individual preferences in the
willingness to migrate illegally and to pay a smuggler. Finally, we examine the relationship
between migration and credit markets in the context of rural Senegal.
Environment and migration in developing countries
A sustainable development is possible only with the preservation of the environment.
The rst chapter of this thesis is related to the environmental issue because it raises
many concerns in developing countries which have to deal with an intensication of envi-
ronmental degradation partially due to climate change. This environmental decline can
then induce natural disasters among other problems and may force the population of poor
countries to consider migration as one of the solutions to confront this issue. According
to the Stern report (2007), climate change and the resultant environmental degradation
weaken states and decrease their ability to provide opportunities and services to help peo-
ple become less vulnerable, above all if those people already live in marginalized areas. On
top of poverty, developing countries are often in a disadvantageous situation due to rapid
population growth, massive urbanization and their geographical environment, all of which
make them more vulnerable and less able to adapt to environmental degradation. The
latter reduces GDP growth, and increases the decit and the external debt of countries
2often already weakened economically. Furthermore, their low levels of income and their
underdeveloped nancial markets make for unattainable insurances and credits to cover
them in case of climatic shocks. It also increases their vulnerability at the individual and
national levels. There is a crowding-out e¤ect because the poorest are obliged to reallo-
cate their resources to deal with the consequences of environmental degradation instead
of investing in human capital expenditure such as childrens education or other productive
investments. In the current context, less-developed countries may be then trapped in a
vicious circle: their poverty makes them more vulnerable in the face of climate change
and, due to their poverty, climate change will have serious consequences on health, income
and growth prospects and will worsen their poverty and vulnerability.
The economic context of Senegal
Three chapters of this thesis are related to the Senegalese context. In order to justify
our choice of country to study and to have a better understanding of the situation of
Senegal, we present the main socio-economic indicators and the situation that has led to
the intensication of international migration from Senegal since the eighties.1
According to ESAM II (Enquête Sénégalaise Auprès des Ménages) and the ESPS
(Enquête de Suivi de la Pauvreté au Sénégal), in 2010, GDP was estimated at 6 367
billion of Fcfa i.e. 9, 697 billion Euros and GDP per capita was estimated at 509 096 Fcfa
i.e. 775 Euros. The HDI (Human Development Index) was estimated at 0.464, ranking
Senegal in 166th place out of 182 countries. The poverty rate remains high even though
it signicantly decreased between 2002 and 2005.2 According to The share of households
1We are interested in indicators from 2005 to 2010 because chapters 2 and 3 about illegal migration
are based on a survey conducted in 2006 and chapter 4 about the relationship between migration and
credit markets uses data collected in 2009.
2Source: Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers (PSRP II) 2011-2015.
3living beneath the poverty line was estimated at 48.5% in 2002 whereas it represented
42.6% in 2005. However, these impartial measures showing a decrease of the poverty
rate are di¤erent from the perception of Senegalese households. For instance, 52% of
households considered themselves as poor in 2005-2006 and 44% think that poverty has
worsened during the last ve years. Moreover, the growth rate was lower than 3% each
year from 2006 to 2009 which represents a decrease relative to its historical trend (5% from
1994 to 2005). Young people represent 52% of the unemployed and are those who su¤er
the most in this economic situation.3 The economic crisis of 2008 and low productivity
in the agricultural sector may explain a large part of these gures. Growth is largely
dependent on climatic events which were not favorable during these last years. The
strategy of poverty reduction was then slowed down by shocks, faced by the population
above all in rural areas, such as locust plagues, unseasonably heavy rains, oods and
droughts. Another explanation of the economic downturn is related to issues faced by the
private sector which has to deal with a lack of competitiveness due to high production
costs, administrative burdens, badly functioning infrastructure such as untimely power
cuts or transportation issues, above all in Dakar, and the di¢culty of getting access
to funding. Nevertheless, some improvements have been made particularly with APIX
(Agence chargée de la Promotion, de lInvestissement et des grands travauX). The role
of this national agency is to promote a good business environment in order to spark the
interest of investors. E¤orts have also been made to improve social indicators. Education
and health sectors have an important place in the development strategy of the country.
From 2005, 50% of the national budget was allocated to these sectors (40% for education
3Source : Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers (PSRP II) 2011-2015 and Situation Economique et
Sociale du Senegal en 2010 - Agence Nationale de la Statistique du Senegal : www.ands.sn.
4and 10% for health). Unfortunately these improvements have to be put into perspective
with the ine¢ciency of the education system in terms of insertion for instance, or the
poor quality of teachers.
Moreover, there are many issues related to two of the main economic sectors of Sene-
gal, namely agriculture and shing. According to the PSRP II 2011-2015, 60 % of the
Senegalese population work and derive their income from the agricultural sector. Issues
related to agriculture a¤ect both food producers and producers of cash crops such as
peanuts. Living conditions are very di¢cult in rural areas because of the lack of drink-
ing water, electricity, roads and infrastructure in general; methods used are rudimentary;
agricultural production is poorly diversied and the income of many farmers is dependent
solely on the rain. A quick look at some facts presented in a chronological way will provide
a better understanding of the issues related to the agricultural sector. Between 1960 and
1965, the agricultural sector was performing well but from the end of the seventies and
the beginning of the eighties, rural areas were confronted by successive droughts. At the
same time, the sector experienced a global downturn in prices which resulted in the decline
of agricultural production. In the middle of the eighties, Senegal beneted from Struc-
tural Adjustments in order to solve the economic imbalances and to generate sustainable
growth. However, these programs had negative e¤ects on the rural sector because they
progressively removed subsidies of fertilizers allocated to farmers who then had to borrow
in order to seed. Unfortunately the bad climatic situation and the decrease of crop prices
obliged them to borrow yet more in order to repay their loans. Furthermore, according to
the PSRP II covering the period from 2003 to 2005, even if the currency devaluation of
1994 allowed an improvement in the price competitiveness of Senegalese exports, it was
5not enough to increase foreign trade. The country exported large quantities of peanuts
which are less in demand at a global level and which su¤er from constraints related to
access to international markets. In 2001, the government tried to support agricultural ac-
tivity through the SONACOS (SOciété NAtionale de Commercialisation des Oléagineux
du Senegal) which is the national rm in charge of the marketing of oilseed in Senegal.
This solution was unfortunately not viable because the rm became deeply in debt in
order to buy the agricultural production. The Senegalese government then liberalized
the sector by giving fewer subsidies. The government also decreased the prices paid to
farmers and the quantities purchased. The situation further deteriorated in 2002 because
of unfavorable climatic conditions. In addition to all these elements, the insu¢ciency of
agricultural production led to starvation in many rural areas. This agricultural situation
probably helps to explain an increase, from 2005, in the pressure to migrate illegally. The
Senegalese government at this time showed a political will to improve the sector. It cre-
ated the REVA (REtour Vers lAgriculture) program meaning a return to agriculture and
whose purpose was to promote the insertion of young people into agriculture. However,
the REVA project did not seem to be adapted to the qualication and the will of young
people. The government also created the GOANA (Grande O¤ensive Agricole pour la
Nourriture et lAbondance) project in 2008 in order to improve production, income and
food security in rural areas. This political will is valuable but it is not yet enough to cope
with the structural issues of the sector.
The second main economic sector in crisis is the sheries. Issues related to this sector
are due to a dwindling of sh stocks and the disappearance of many species as a result
of overexploitation. This is largely due to the competition of foreign shing boats. For
6instance, in 1979, Senegal was one of the rst countries to sign an agreement with the
European Union to allow it to sh within its territorial waters. In 2005 and 2006 an
agreement allowed 125 ships from the European Union access to Senegalese waters. These
agreements are very useful in terms of revenue but they are costly for the shing industry
(UNDP, 2005; OCDE, 2006).4 Moreover, increases in the price of oil made this activity
very expensive.
Many people from rural and urban areas therefore have to deal with bad living con-
ditions because of the economic situation described above. This makes them more vul-
nerable to, and less able to cope with, negative shocks which can result in a vicious circle
of poverty. It also explains their desire to leave rural areas and even the country because
rural-urban migration is no longer enough to improve their quality of life. Therefore,
international migration has become for them one of the survival strategies.
Senegal is both a country of immigration and emigration. However, since the eighties,
emigration exceeds immigration. According to the denition of the Ministry of Senegalese
living abroad, the number of Senegalese living abroad is estimated at 3 000 000 and this
gure is underestimated because it does not take into account either people who do not
register at the Senegalese Consular service in the host country or illegal immigrants.5 6
Between 1999 and 2004, 46% of Senegalese migrants went to Europe, 44% to Africa and
4In Dayton-Johnson et al. (2006).
5There are three di¤erent sources of data about emigrants from Senegal. According to the RGPH
(Recensement Général de la Population et de lHabitat) 2002, the Senegalese census, an emigrant is
an individual who left Senegal at least ve years before the census and who was absent at the time of
the census. This denition is di¤erent from the one of the Ministry of Senegalese living abroad. Their
conception is larger because it includes all people with Senegalese citizenship living abroad either for a
long time, recently or who were born in a foreign country.
6Source : Situation Economique et Sociale du Senegal (2010)- Agence Nationale de la Statistique du
Senegal : www.ands.sn .
78% to the U.S..7 The rst international destination was France, followed by Italy, the
U.S. and Spain. However, the French destination is largely becoming replaced by the
three other countries (Fall, 2010). Employment is the main reason for migration, followed
by education and family purposes. The Senegalese migrant tends to be young, male and
relatively well educated. The rate of return migration is estimated at 9% which is quite
low. Senegal is one of the main recipient African countries of remittances which represent
9.3% of the GDP (Ratha et al., 2011). Migrants consequently have an important economic
power and contribute much to the improvement of living conditions of their families left
behind.
Outline of the thesis
The thesis presents four chapters that relate the migration issue to three major chal-
lenges faced by developing countries namely the environmental issue, the phenomenon of
illegal migration and the development of the credit markets.
The rst chapter assesses, in developing countries, the e¤ect of natural disasters mainly
due to climate change on migration rates and looks at how this e¤ect varies according
to the level of education. The relationship between climate change, natural disasters
and migration is crucial because developed countries need to manage the complicated
issues of additional incoming migratory ows caused by environmental degradation. We
investigate this relationship by using panel data from developing countries. Estimations
are made with a country xed e¤ects estimator. The results show that natural disasters
are positively associated with emigration rates. Another contribution of the study is to
show that natural disasters mainly due to climate change exacerbate the brain drain in
7Direction de la Prévision et de la Statistique (2004).
8developing countries when those are at their most vulnerable and need greater support
from skilled workers. We also nd that this e¤ect is not homogeneous and depends on
geographical location of countries.
The second chapter presents the di¤erent channels explaining the willingness to mi-
grate illegally. One of the novelties of the analysis is that it uses a tailor-made survey
among urban Senegalese individuals. We show that potential illegal migrants are willing
to accept a substantial risk of death (25% at the median) and tend to be young, single
and with a low level of education. We also nd that the price of illegal migration, migrant
networks and high expectations towards the living standards in the popular destination
countries, all play an important role in the consideration of an individual to decide to
migrate illegally. Furthermore, potential illegal migrants may not be deterred by a tight-
ening of immigration policies. A detailed analysis shows that some particular destinations
are more attractive in the willingness to migrate illegally.
The third chapter completes the second one by studying the role of time and risk
preferences in illegal migration from Senegal. On the basis of our theoretical model, we
evaluate a measure of the time and risk preferences through individual discount rates and
individual coe¢cients of absolute risk aversion. Then, we empirically test our theoretical
propositions and we show that in addition to other determinants of migration such as
the expected foreign wage, networks, immigration policies or migration prices, individual
preferences matter in the willingness to migrate illegally and to pay a smuggler.
Finally in the last chapter, we look at how migrants a¤ect rural credit markets in a
Senegalese context. We assume that migrants can inuence the credit markets by being
the collateral and the "element of trust" in the credit contract between the borrower and
9the lender because they represent a potential solution and can play an insurance role in
case of non-repayment. Therefore, we are interested in the e¤ect of having a migrant
in a household on the likelihood of having a loan and on the size of the loan. After
controlling for potential reverse causation of the migration variable, results show that
having a migrant in a household increases both the likelihood of having a loan and the
loan size, whether the loan is formal or informal. However, the e¤ect is stronger for the
informal than for the formal loan size. We also nd that this positive e¤ect remains
signicant no matter if the loan is taken for professional activities or simply to buy food.
10
Chapter 1
Climate Change, Natural Disasters
and Migration: An Empirical
Analysis in Developing Countries
1.1. Introduction
International migration is a great concern to developing countries. The movement of
human capital is led by economic, demographic, political, social, cultural and environmen-
tal factors in both the sending countries (push factors) as well as in destination countries
(pull factors). The main reason for international migration found in the theoretical and
0The chapter is joint work with Alassane Drabo (CERDI, Université dAuvergne).
0Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the 17th Annual International Sustainable Devel-
opment Research Conference at the Earth Institute, Columbia University in New York and at the IZA
workshop on Environment and Labor in Bonn. We are very grateful to conference and workshop partic-
ipants for their helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Simone Bertoli for useful discussions.
The usual disclaimer applies.
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the empirical literature is di¤erences in economic opportunities or, more precisely, wages
di¤erential (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Ghatak, Levine and Price, 1996). Beyond the wages
di¤erential, migration is considered as a way to diversify income sources (Stark, 1991), to
deal with bad political institutions, large social disparities, conicts, and the lack of good
infrastructure. People also migrate for family reunication or to join relatives abroad.
Finally, because of globalization, there is a decreasing of the uncertainty, caused by mod-
ern communication technologies such as the internet and satellite TV, which might be an
explanation for persistently rising migration in recent decades. In a word, migration is a
possibility for people to improve their quality of life and all the factors previously named
can be directly or indirectly a¤ected by climate change and natural disasters.
History demonstrates that climate change is often associated with massive movements
of population and that the natural environment is probably the oldest determinant of mi-
gration and population displacement. Many studies such as the Stern report (2007) and
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) predict an intensication
of climate change for the forthcoming years. According to the International Organiza-
tion for Migration (IOM), by the half century, 200 million people (equal to the current
estimate of international migrants) could be permanent or temporary environmental mi-
grants1 within their countries or overseas. Climate change has, thus, taken an important
place in world governance. But the partial failure of important meetings on climate change
issue (Copenhagen Conference 2009, Rio 2011, Durban 2011) shows that it is di¢cult for
1We consider the term environmental migrants, because it is larger and inclusive than environmental
refugees. It takes into account the forced population displacement due to environmental reasons; with
push factors largely more determinant then pull factors (see Appendix A.1 for other denitions).
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the states to agree on the strategy to adopt in order to reduce their impact on the envi-
ronment. The interests and the means of action are di¤erent according to each nations
level of development. Indeed, developed countries are responsible for an important part2
of pollution and greenhouse gas emission compared to developing countries, which bear
the brunt of this environmental degradation and are disproportionately a¤ected because
of their economic vulnerability and their lack of means due to poverty. This environmen-
tal decline can induce natural disasters among other problems and, for the population
of those countries, migration is one of the solutions to confront this issue. The man-
agement of supplementary migratory ows due to environmental degradation are made
more complicated for developed countries by issues of migration from developing coun-
tries. Environmental migration is often at the origin of population displacement which
can a¤ect the stability of the hosting areas in many ways. It can induce conicts with
local populations by putting pressure on employment and local wages, trade and natural
resources such as water, especially if those regions are already poor.
Since the second half of the eighties, many studies have been conducted on the e¤ect
of climate change on involuntary population displacement. In recent decades, Reuveny
(2007) argues that the e¤ects of climate change on migration can be predicted by exploring
the e¤ects of environmental problems on migration. People can adapt to these problems
by either staying in place and doing nothing, staying in place and mitigating the problems,
or by leaving the a¤ected areas, depending on the extent of problems and the mitigation
capabilities. According to Smith (2007) migration on a permanent or temporary basis has
always been one of the most important survival strategies adopted by people confronted by
2Rich countries will be responsible for 60-80% of gas emission by 2050 (Stern, 2007).
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natural or human-caused disasters. Naudé (2010) shows in the Sub-Saharan Africa context
that environmental pressure has an impact on migration through the frequency of natural
disasters. Poston et al., (2009) show the e¤ect of climate change on in-migration, out-
migration and net migration among 50 states of the United States of America and their
results are conrmed by Reuveny and Moore (2009) who demonstrate that environmental
decline plays a statistically signicant role in out-migration, pushing people to leave their
homes and move to other countries. Finally, Marchiori and Schumacher (2011) found that
minor impacts of climate change have major impacts on the numbers of migrants.
Relative to this literature, the main contribution and the aim of this chapter is to
examine the relationship between climate change and migration by studying the e¤ect on
migration rates of natural disasters caused by climate change but above all, and di¤erent
from previous studies, by examining the e¤ect of natural disasters on migration in the
context of the level of peoples education.
The chapter then investigates the relationship between climate change, migration and
natural disasters by using panel data from developing countries. Estimations are made
with a country xed e¤ects estimator through an accurate econometric model and the
results conrm previous studies, namely that natural disasters are positively associated
with emigration rates. But, beyond this, the chapter shows that natural disasters mainly
due to climate change exacerbate the brain drain in developing countries by involving the
migration of highly skilled people, and this e¤ect varies depending on the geographical
location of the countries.
The next section presents a literature review on the climate change issue in developing
countries and the relationship between climate change, natural disasters and migration.
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In Section 1.3 we present the empirical design while the estimations results and robustness
checks are discussed in Section 1.4. Concluding remarks and implications are provided in
the last section.
1.2. Literature review
The forecasts concerning environmental issues due to climate change are alarming.
According to Dyson (2006), there will inevitably be a major rise in atmospheric CO2
during the 21st century due among other causes to the momentum in economic and
demographic processes. Stern (2007) warns that, by 2035, a rise in temperature of over
2EC induced by a rapid increase of greenhouse gas emissions could be doubled compared
with its pre-industrial level.3 In the long term, the temperature rise may exceed 5EC, which
is equivalent to the change in average temperatures from the last ice age to today. Marine
eco-systems and food stocks are threatened by oceanic acidication due to carbon dioxide
levels. Due to global warming, the Arctic will be ice-free in summer by 2100 because of
a reduction of sea ice, and 15 to 40% of its species may become extinct. Melting glaciers
will result in a rise in sea levels, particularly in the subtropics (Meehl and al., 2006),
putting pressure on coastal areas and small islands. It will also threaten 4 million km2
of land representing home to 5% of the worlds population, and may increase ood risks
during wet seasons and reduced water supplies to one sixth of the worlds population.
Global warming, by altering the environment, has a signicant e¤ect on human health
and infectious diseases (Schrag and Wiener, 1995; Khasnis and Nettleman, 2005). It
3According to this report, average global temperatures could increase by 2-3EC within the next fty
years.
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entails natural disasters which a¤ect housing, infrastructure, crop yield and livestock and
consequently weakens economies (Perch-Nielsen et al., 2008).
1.2.1. Climate change issue in developing countries
Climate has a signicant e¤ect on well-being and levels of happiness. Rehdanz and Mad-
dison (2005) show that temperature changes benet high latitude countries whereas they
negatively a¤ect low latitude countries. Indeed, a small amount of global warming would
increase the happiness of those living in Northern countries, whereas it is the reverse
for people living in high temperature regions. According to Stern (2007), predictions
for developing countries reveal alarming future agricultural output and a reduction in
crop yields, food security and issues related to water. Climate change involves droughts
which are responsible for an increase in food prices, disease, and consequently an increase
in health expenditure. Moreover, populations have to deal with the issue of water, the
most climate sensitive economic resource for these countries. In South Asia, for exam-
ple, climate change will increase rainfall and ooding with a direct e¤ect on agricultural
production, and with serious consequences in a region with a high population growth. In
Latin America and Caribbean areas, serious threats exist to the rainforests with direct
consequences for the subsistence of populations depending on the Amazonian forest. In
Sub-Saharan Africa, an increase in sea level threatens coastal cities when higher temper-
atures raise risks of malnutrition, starvation and malaria, decreased river ow and the
subsequent availability of water. In the Nile Basin, the Middle East and North African
countries, water stress and severe droughts could cause migration and violent conicts.4
4In SSA, on 80 million people su¤ering of starvation due to environmental factors, 7 million migrated
to obtain food (Myers, 2005). The increasing in temperature of 2EC involve an increasing in population
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Many developing countries are experiencing an increase in the frequency and costs of
natural disasters which are estimated on average at 5% of their GDP between 1997 and
2001 (IMF, 2003). In India and South East Asia the reduction in GDP due to climate
change is estimated between 9 and 13% by 2100 compared with a situation without climate
change. The cost of adaptation for these countries will be at least between 5% and 10% of
GDP and will weigh on government budgets, all the more so since less than 1% of losses
from natural disasters were insured in low-income countries from 1985 to 1999. The
frequency of climate events does not give time to rebuild or reconstitute their patrimony,
keeping them in a poverty trap. Immediate and strong reactions are then necessary for
these specic countries to limit the serious impact of climate change on them. In spite
of this situation described previously, climate change is unfortunately considered as a
long-term problem and future impacts of climate change do not have priority. Concerning
this point, Ikeme (2003) analyzes the low capacity adaptation of Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) countries to cope with climate change e¤ects. Low adaptive capacity increases
vulnerability, social and economic costs which a¤ect human capital and the development
levels of these areas, which constitute transmission channels for migration. For these
countries, adaptation does not appear to be urgent issue and is underestimated by these
most vulnerable countries. Indeed, even if adaptation is globally recognized as a means to
preventing and coping with the impacts of climate change, there is a relative indi¤erence
and insu¢cient measures in order to reinforce the capacity of adaptation. These countries
are often in a di¢cult context with problems such as poverty, institutional weakness, low
a¤ected by malaria in Africa of 40-80 million people (70-80 million people a¤ected with an increasing of
3EC-4EC). By 2020, between 75 and 250 million of African people will be exposed to water stress caused
by climate change (Stern, 2007).
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levels of education and skills or an inexistence of welfare systems; they are then obliged
to act in emergency in case of climate e¤ects (Washington and al., 2006). Moreover,
developing countries, particularly in SSA, consider the developed countries to be the
major cause of climate change, and wish to let them take the responsibility to manage
them.
1.2.2. How climate change and natural disasters can a¤ect migration?
Migration is considered as a possible adaptive response to risks associated with climate
change (Mcleman and Smit, 2006). Using Northern Ethiopia as an example, Meze-
Hausken (2000) shows how climate change triggers migration in dryland areas of less
developed countries. The impact of drought on migration depends on the intensity of
the change, the vulnerability of the individual who su¤ers the change and the availability
of survival strategies. The intensity of the climate change includes damage caused by
the combination of natural, socio-economic, technological and perceived conditions. The
vulnerability means an individuals risk of exposure to the severe consequences of climatic
disaster and the incapacity to cope with its consequences. Survival strategies are actions
taken to avert and to manage the climatic disaster after the event. At the beginning of a
drought, not all people are equally vulnerable in the face of the climatic change. Families
with more survival strategies manage to resist migration longer than those with fewer
survival strategies. But there comes a time after which survival strategies are reduced
for all members of society at which point all people are a¤ected in similar ways and are
obliged to migrate. Migration is a solution to the failure of di¤erent survival strategies.
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Nevertheless it is important to recognize that, in regions already with a high level of
poverty and di¢cult living conditions, climatic change is a triggering factor of migration.
Notwithstanding this, views di¤er on whether migration could be considered as adap-
tation. Some characterize migration as a failure of, rather than as a form of, adaptation.
Some operational organizations and academics point out the role that migration may play
in helping home communities to adapt themselves, using the resources from migrant re-
mittances (IOM, 2007; Barnett and Jones, 2002). Others express the view that migration
is a maladaptive response because the migration may trigger an increased risk for those
who move and also possibly for areas towards which migrants move (Oliver-Smith, 2009).
Socially some factors including governance help determine whether people, threatened
by rapid or slow onset environmental change, can remain in their homes or return once
the threat has passed. For instance, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, out of the
1.5 million people displaced, only one-third returned and governance played a large role
in that instance, underlining the need to understand how social and ecological factors
interact and shape human mobility in the face of global environmental change (Warner,
2010).
According to Naudé (2010), climate change a¤ects and can intensify migration through
three channels, namely scarcity of water and land, natural hazards, and conicts over
natural resources. Indeed, migration towards new areas is often one of the main factors
of environmental conicts (Baechler, 1999b; Swain, 1993; Swain, 1996). Climate change
may cause tensions and conicts in communities receiving migrants (Barnett and Adger,
2007). McGregor (1994), studying the link between environmental change, migration and
food security, shows that the displacement of a population due to climate change can
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induce conicts linked to the food security of the hosting areas. Food aid given to the
refugees may destabilize food prices and the local production of the host economy, which
in turn can cause malnutrition in refugee camps or weaken some regions already a¤ected
by food shortages.
1.2.3. Some stylized facts
Many stylized facts illustrate the relationship between climate change, natural disasters
and migration. In Chinese ancient history, between 3550 and 2200 BC, during Chinas
Bronze Age, the settled Zhou tribes experienced conicts with the nomadic Rong and
Di tribes and were relocated ve times. Historians attributed these migrations only to
political and military reasons whereas the movement of populations was also caused by
climate change. Those migrations were a means to protect agriculture by conserving
resources in order to economize food production threatened by drought (Huang and Su,
2008). The climatic factor also inuenced Polynesian migrations between 300 and 1400
(Bridgman, 1983).
Similarly in Asia in 1975, as a method of increasing self-reliance and to provide food
security to its population, India constructed the Farraka dam on the River Ganges per-
mitting large-scale irrigation of state land. But this project, by over-exploiting the river
and diverting most of the Ganges dry-season water, and without consulting Bangladesh
which shares the river, induced serious ecological and political consequences. The conse-
quential environmental degradation a¤ected the living conditions of Bangladeshis through
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the destabilization of their ecosystem, the destruction of their essential sources of liveli-
hood such as agriculture, industrial production and shing. The environmental destruc-
tion caused by the Indian dam rstly a¤ected the rural ecosystem and then displaced
the Bangladesh population towards urban areas. But the low absorption capacity of
Bangladesh cities made migration to India the only viable alternative. Subsequently the
environmentally-caused displacement of the Bangladeshi migrants constituted a burden
for Indian society, putting pressure on the availability of food and the labor market. Since
these migrants were Muslims yet the major proportion of the receiving country was Hindu,
problems were intensied by ethnic and political issues. Tensions between migrants and
natives of the host country resulted in regional conict which then spread to other parts
of India (Swain, 1996). In Mali in the 1970s and 1980s, drought caused the migration
of Tuareg people towards other countries. When they returned to Mali they were mar-
ginalized by the competition between nomad and settled people, resulting in a rebellion
in 1990 (Meier and Bond, 2007). The El Niño events between the 1970s and 1990s caused
extended droughts in Ethiopia. They were followed by famine and political turmoil that
resulted in radical changes of government, secession, and a massive program of population
redistribution. The consequences of government-imposed migration policies, whose cata-
lyst was climate change caused by repeated El Niño events, were certain changes in the
ethnic composition and the geographic pattern of population growth of certain Ethiopian
regions (Comenetz and Caviedes, 2002). Repeated droughts in the Senegal River basin
triggered a conict between Senegal and Mauritania which started when the river began
to recede (Niasse, 2005). In 1996-1997 a severe drought induced a mass migration from
Kenya to Somalia and Ethiopia. Because of a lack of adaptation and e¢cient measures,
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countries such as Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Kenya viewed their economies seriously
a¤ected respectively by droughts in 1992, oods in 1998, and cyclones in 2000. Nigeria,
Senegal and Angola are all vulnerable to rises in sea level and ooding which a¤ected
thousands of people (Ikeme, 2003; Benson and Clay, 1998; Ngecu and Mathu, 1999).
In 2004, the tsunami in Indonesia displaced 500,000 people whereas Hurricane Katrina
in 2005 had serious consequences on human displacement with tens of thousands of mi-
grants in 26 states of the USA. Hurricane Mitch, like Katrina, had a devastating e¤ect
on the most vulnerable people and increased male migration from Honduras to Nicaragua
(Smith, 2007).
1.3. Empirical design
The empirical framework is developed in this section and, before presenting the data,
the main specications showing the di¤erent relationships between natural disasters and
migration are discussed.
1.3.1. Methodology
Firstly, the e¤ect of natural disasters caused by climate change on net migration rates is
estimated using the following specication:
(1.1) migi;t = B1disasteri;t + BkXk;i;t + i + Fi;t
Where migi;t and disasteri;t are respectively the migration and natural disaster vari-
ables for the country i at the period t; Xk;i;t is the vector of control variables generally
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used in migration estimations; i represents the countries xed e¤ects and Fi;t the error
term. The coe¢cient of natural disasters is expected to be positive.
Secondly, the analysis is specied by taking migration rates according to the education
levels. We are interested in this point because we assume that natural disasters caused by
climate change may a¤ect the migration of people who are more educated or those who
are more skilled. Often they are those who get a job and a salary so they have the means
to go abroad, to be safe, and to provide insurance for their family back in the a¤ected
country. With respect to policy implications, they can induce a brain drain whose e¤ects
will be more serious in this context where countries need large support for rebuilding and
have a special need for skilled workers. We assume that this e¤ect is higher for the most
highly educated. Thus we have:
(1.2) migeducji;t = B
j
1disasteri;t + B
j
kXk;i;t + i + F
j
i;t
Where migeducji;t is the migration rate associated with each educational level j (j=
low, medium and high educational levels).
The two objectives already discussed are estimated by using country OLS xed e¤ects
estimator through an accurate econometric model. However, one may assume some endo-
geneity issues caused by measurement errors of the variable of interest or by a potential
double causation bias between migration and natural disasters. But in our case we do not
have these problems because we eliminate the measurement errors by using the Center
for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) data which identies the number
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of natural disasters each time such events arrive. Secondly, we assume that migration at
the period t cannot cause natural disasters at t or before t, but only in the future. Since
we estimate the e¤ect of the number of natural disasters at the period t on the migration
rate at the same period, we do not have a double causality issue.
1.3.2. Data
The objective of this chapter is to assess the e¤ect of natural disasters caused by cli-
mate change on global migration rates and on migration rates according to the level of
education. This relationship is investigated by using panel data with countries as unit
observations. The dependent variables are the net migration rates between 1950 and 2010
made available by the United Nations Population Division and measured as the number of
immigrants minus the number of emigrants over the period, divided by the person-years
lived by the population of the receiving country over that period. It is expressed as the
net number of migrants per 1,000 population. However, we choose to use the opposite of
this measure (the di¤erence between the total number of emigrants minus the number of
immigrants divided by the person-years lived by the population of the receiving country
over that period) to be in conformity with the other migration indicators with regard to
their sign: indeed, a higher level of these variables indicates a higher level of migration.
We also use the Panel Data on International Migration of M. Schi¤ and M.C Sjöblom
(2008) (World Bank Databases)5, which measures international migration from 1975 to
2000 of the six main destination countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, UK and
USA. This data set uses the same methodology as Defoort (2008). It measures emigration
5http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0contentMDK:21866422
~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html
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rates through the stocks of migrants from sending countries to these countries for three
educational levels, namely low, medium and high, divided by the stock of adults (+25)
corresponding to the same educational level, in the country of origin plus the stock of
migrants of sending countries. In order to make comparable gures with net migration
variable, we multiply this rate by 1000 and thus consider the migration rate for each 1000
inhabitants. We prefer this database to that produced by Docquier and Marfouk (2006);
the latter uses the same measure but for all OECD countries in 1990 and 2000, whereas
the former has a larger temporal dimension and thus more observations.
For the climate change indicators representing the variables of interest, we use the
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster (CRED) data (2010) from 1900 to
2010. Firstly we use the total number of natural disasters in a country in a ve year period.
Secondly we are interested in: meteorological disasters using a variable which considers
the number of events caused by storms; hydrological disasters using a variable which
groups together the number of events caused by oods and other wet mass movements;
and climatological disasters which measures the number of disasters caused by drought,
wildre and extremely high temperatures. We are interested in these three measures
because they are the natural disasters which are mainly caused by climate change. All
the climate change variables are divided by the logarithmic of surface area. Indeed, we
assume that to compare the e¤ect of the number and the intensity of natural disasters
of a large country to a smaller one, it is more relevant to consider the climate change
variables by kilometers squared to take into account the size of the country. For instance,
one natural disaster in Russia or China does not have the same consequences on the whole
country characteristics as compared to a smaller country.
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We control for the additional explanatory variables that can inuence migration (see
Appendix A.2 and A.3 for the denition of variables and sources, and summary statistics).
GDP per capita measures the development level of the countries. It also allows measur-
ing their economic conjuncture. In fact, this variable provides information about some
economic indicators such as the unemployment rate or the scal decit. And given that
panel data are used in this study, the changes over time period capture variation in the
GDP per capita and then give an idea about the evolution of the economic performance.
Demographic pressure is measured through variables such as the total population which
is another indicator of the size of the country; the young population and the population
density to control for the dynamism of the population in terms of migration. The variable
availability of arable land captures the economic opportunities of a country above all in
developing countries where agriculture is the main activity. The quality of the institu-
tional situation in the country is measured through political rights and civil war variables
which highly lead to displacement of population.
1.4. Results
1.4.1. Natural disasters and net migration rates
[Table 1.1 HERE]
[Table 1.2 HERE]
Estimations are made for poor and middle-to-lower income countries. Table 1.1 shows
the results of the e¤ect of natural disasters on net migration rates. Natural disasters are
captured by four indicators divided by the logarithmic of surface area: the total number
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of natural disasters (Column 1) and its desegregated components per km2, namely me-
teorological, hydrological and climatological disasters (Column 2 to 4). The number of
natural disasters per km2 has a signicant positive impact on net migration rates con-
rming previously documented results (Naudé, 2010; Reuveny and Moore, 2009). This
result is conrmed by the sub-components of natural disasters except for the climatolog-
ical variable which becomes signicant with one period lag (Column 5). Moreover, if we
introduce natural disasters and their disaggregated variables with one period lag (Table
1.2), it appears that all these variables are signicant and positive. In a word, natural
disasters have a contemporaneous and lagged e¤ect except for climatological events that
have only a lagged e¤ect. This is due to the fact that for storms, included in meteoro-
logical disasters, or oods and wet mass movements included in hydrological events, the
mitigation and adaptation capabilities are less available for these types of events than
for extreme temperatures events or droughts which are in the climatological category.
Indeed, during short term hydrological events, people have less choice to stay, whereas
climatological events permit them time to prepare their migration in the future.
1.4.2. The e¤ect of the intensity of natural disasters on migration
[Table 1.3 HERE]
Even though the occurrence of natural disasters is a good measure, one could assume
that the intensity is more relevant in assessing the relationship between climate change
and migration. Thus, to check the robustness of the previous results, we make our es-
timations by using, for each sub-group of natural disasters (meteorological, hydrological
and climatological variables), the costs representing total damages in US$; the number
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of deaths and the number of people injured, made homeless and otherwise a¤ected. Esti-
mations in Table 1.3 conrm the previous results in Table 1.1 except for the number of
deaths and the number of people a¤ected by hydrological disasters which are not signif-
icant. The contemporaneous e¤ect of the intensity variables of natural disasters on net
migration exists for meteorological events, but only the damage caused by hydrological
events increase net migration rates.
1.4.3. The e¤ect of natural disasters on migration according to the education
level
[Table 1.4 HERE]
The e¤ect of natural disasters on migration according to the educational level is pre-
sented in Table 1.4. The dependent variables are emigration rates with respectively low,
medium and high educational levels. The interest variable remains the number of natural
disasters. Only those individuals with a high level of education migrate in the case of an
increased incidence in the number of natural disasters. This result can be explained by
the cost of migration. In fact, skilled people are less likely to be unemployed and then
can easily support migration costs. Moreover because of their skills, they can more easily
get legitimate documents to enter host countries. Then, natural disasters due to climate
change may heighten the brain drain phenomenon in developing countries just when they
need the most skilled and qualied people to deal with the damage caused by natural
disasters.
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1.4.4. Robustness check: the e¤ect of natural disasters on highly educated
migrants according to geographical location
[Table 1.5 HERE]
Even if natural disasters a¤ect all countries, it is interesting to test if the behavior of
highly educated people in the face of migration depends on the geographical location of
the countries. The dependent variable is the migration of highly educated populations
and the variables of interest are the number of natural disasters and some interaction
terms between the number of natural disasters and geographical dummies6 . We nd
in Table 1.5 some di¤erences in migration behavior in Europe and Central Asia (ECA),
Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and South
Asia (SA) regions. The e¤ect is positive for ECA, LAC and SA regions, where we observe
increased migration rates of highly skilled people caused by natural disasters compared
to other regions. For South Asia, the reason for this result may be due to the high
frequency of natural disasters in this area and the low resilience of these countries. For
ECA and LAC regions, we can assume that the migration policies could be more tolerant
for skilled workers in general and migrants are integrated more easily in the job market
of the receiving countries if they are qualied. This seems true particularly in case of
negative shocks such as natural disasters. There is a negative relationship between the
variable MENA and the migration variable which means that natural disasters involve
less migration of highly educated people than other region. Therefore it is very unlikely
that highly skilled people from the MENA region compared to the other regions migrate
6We do not run the estimations for each sub-region dummy because of their low sample size.
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because of natural disasters.7 We do not nd any signicant e¤ect for Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) and East Asia and Pacic (EAP) regions.
1.5. Concluding remarks and Implications
Climate change is one of the main challenges of the twenty-rst century for all coun-
tries in the world in general, and in particular for developing countries which are more
sensitive to its e¤ects. This chapter assesses the relationship between natural disasters
mainly caused by climate change and migration by examining migration rates and levels
of education. Results, from a xed e¤ects estimator, show that natural disasters have a
signicant and positive e¤ect on net migration rates. But this e¤ect is di¤erent according
to the disaster type. Climatological disasters have only a positive lagged e¤ect of one
period on migration, unlike the other types of disaster which have a contemporaneous
and lagged positive impact on migration. We also nd that the e¤ect is not the same for
the di¤erent educational levels. Natural disasters have an e¤ect only on the migration
of people with a high level of education. Finally, we nd some di¤erences in migration
behavior between highly educated people in European Central Asia, Latin America and
Caribbean, Middle, East and North Africa and South Asia regions.
Natural disasters mainly due to climate change raise equity issues for developing coun-
tries by heightening the brain drain e¤ect and by taking away qualications and skills just
when these countries are at their most vulnerable. Developing countries have, of course, to
make some e¤orts, but developed countries must provide more support and increase their
political will to combat climate change and its damaging consequences above all in the
7 All estimates presented in this study are made without dividing by the surface area and all results
remain unchanged except for the size of the coe¢cient.
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Table 1.1. Fixed e¤ects estimation of the e¤ect of natural disasters on in-
ternational migration
Dependent Variable: Net Migration
Indep. Var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Natural Disasters/km2 1.312***
(2.80)
Number of Meteo Disasters/km2 4.563**
(2.50)
Number of Hydro Disasters/km2 4.306***
(2.93)
Number of Climate Disasters/km2 -2.818
(0.37)
Number of Climate Disasters lag/km2 18.874**
(2.17)
Log GDP per capita -5.458* -5.531* -5.853* -4.681 -5.233
(1.69) (1.71) (1.80) (1.37) (1.66)
Log population -35.029** -36.289** -26.494* -43.431*** -41.645**
(2.26) (2.13) (1.82) (2.76) (2.57)
Young population -0.169 -0.162 -0.157 -0.263 -0.147
(0.60) (0.60) (0.57) (0.97) (0.55)
Log Population Density 32.627** 34.570** 23.906* 42.093*** 39.358***
(2.34) (2.22) (1.83) (2.88) (2.72)
Percentage Arable area -0.503 -0.494 -0.492 -0.51 -0.389
(0.89) (0.87) (0.88) (0.87) (0.69)
Political rights 0.038 0.037 0.043 0.02 0.05
(0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.05) (0.13)
Civil war 0.838** 0.929** 0.788** 0.907** 0.853**
(2.24) (2.43) (2.11) (2.37) (2.30)
Constant 480.949** 493.778** 380.163* 578.896*** 556.389**
(2.24) (2.16) (1.90) (2.67) (2.51)
Observations 435 435 435 435 435
Countries 88 88 88 88 88
R2 0.063 0.068 0.068 0.059 0.079
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
poorest countries, for it is the latter, rather than more a­uent countries, which contribute
the least towards climate change and yet which su¤er the greatest consequences.
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Table 1.2. Fixed e¤ects estimation of the e¤ect of lagged natural disasters
on international migration
Dependent Variable: Net Migration
Indep. Var. (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Natural Disasters lag/km2 1.628**
(2.04)
Number of Meteo Disasters lag/km2 2.363**
(2.04)
Number of Hydro Disasters lag/km2 3.458*
(1.75)
Number of Climate Disasters lag/km2 18.874**
(2.17)
Log GDP per capita -5.573 -5.197 -5.437 -5.233
(1.66) (1.58) (1.62) (1.66)
Log Population -39.117** -41.130** -35.925** -41.645**
(2.55) (2.55) (2.32) (2.57)
Young population -0.162 -0.206 -0.158 -0.147
(0.60) (0.73) (0.56) (0.55)
Log population density 36.891*** 39.531*** 33.959** 39.358***
(2.72) (2.73) (2.46) (2.72)
Percentage arable area -0.478 -0.488 -0.496 -0.389
(0.85) (0.86) (0.88) (0.69)
Political rights 0.027 0.03 0.018 0.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.13)
Civil war 0.853** 0.892** 0.842** 0.853**
(2.28) (2.34) (2.23) (2.30)
Constant 529.924** 552.033** 489.854** 556.389**
(2.49) (2.48) (2.30) (2.51)
Observations 435 435 435 435
Countries 88 88 88 88
R2 0.064 0.06 0.064 0.079
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.3. Fixed e¤ects estimation of the e¤ect of natural disasters on international migration (other measures)
Dependent Variable: Net migration
Indep. Var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log Meteo cost/km2 2.230***
(2.91)
Log Meteo death/km2 5.928**
(2.24)
Log Meteo total a¤ected/km2 4.437***
(2.78)
Log hydrological cost/km2 2.318**
(2.18)
Log hydrological death/km2 4.322
(1.38)
Log hydrological total a¤ected/km2 0.038
(0.03)
Log Climatological cost/km2 0.263
(0.16)
Log Climatological death/km2 0.71
(0.26)
Log Climatological total a¤ected/km2 -0.648
(0.63)
Observations 435 435 435 435 435 435 435 435 435
Countries 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88
R2 0.065 0.067 0.089 0.065 0.063 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.06
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All regressions
include a constant and control for the variables: log of GDP per capita, log of the population,
young population, log of population density, percentage of arable area, political rights and civil
war.
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Table 1.4. Fixed e¤ects estimation of the e¤ect of natural disasters on in-
ternational migration according to educational level
Low Medium High
education education education
Indep. Var. (1) (2) (3)
Number of Natural Disasters/km2 -0.744 2.082 17.839**
(0.65) (0.66) (2.34)
Log GDP per capita -5.247* -15.500* -73.368***
(1.82) (1.71) (3.24)
Log population -4.412 -178.97 -458.594***
(0.17) (1.26) (3.79)
Young population -1.318 -2.645 -0.556
(1.53) (1.33) (0.26)
Log population density 2.775 173.998 430.542***
(0.11) (1.27) (3.93)
Percentage arable area 0.522 1.383 5.909*
(0.87) (0.65) (1.74)
Political rights -0.886 -0.168 3.674
(1.62) (0.14) (0.89)
Civil war -0.003 0.447 4.969
(0.01) (0.26) (1.13)
Constant 158.519 2417.43 6190.800***
(0.46) (1.36) (3.93)
Observations 435 435 435
Countries 88 88 88
R2 0.083 0.049 0.094
Note:Robust t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.5. Fixed e¤ects estimation of the e¤ect of natural disasters on international migration
according to geographical regions
Dependent variable: High educated migration rate
Indep.var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of Natural Disasters/km2 22.051*** 24.234 17.565** 15.965** 19.225** 11.763
(3.31) (1.61) (2.29) (2.06) (2.52) (1.58)
(Disaster)x(SSA) -2.17
(1.17)
(Disaster)x(EAP) -0.735
(0.67)
(Disaster)x(ECA) 7.833*
(1.77)
(Disaster)x(LAC) 3.774**
(2.35)
(Disaster)x(MENA) -3.267**
(2.57)
(Disaster)x(SA) 2.228*
(1.68)
Observations 435 435 435 435 435 435
Countries 88 88 88 88 88 88
R2 0.099 0.095 0.095 0.099 0.098 0.101
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All regressions include a constant
and control for the variables: log of GDP per capita, log of the population, young population, log of population
density, percentage of arable area, political rights and civil war
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Appendix
A.1 Denitions
A.2 Denition of variables and sources
A.3 Summary statistics
A.4 Country list
A.1 Denitions
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) denition
"Climate change in IPCC usage refers to a change in the state of the climate that can
be identied (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability
of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It
refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of
human activity. This usage di¤ers from that in the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), where climate change refers to a change of climate that
is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the
global atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate variability observed over
comparable time periods".
Denitions of environmental migrants/ refugees
El Hinnawi (1985): Environmental migrants are "people who have been forced to leave
their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental
disruption that jeopardized their existence or seriously a¤ected the quality of their life".
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Bates (2002) criticizes the denition and classication of environmental migration of
El-Hinnawi in the UNEP 1985 report. For Bates this denition does not provide generic
criteria distinguishing environmental refugees from other types of migrants and not spec-
ify di¤erences between types of environmental refugees. It makes no distinction between
refugees who ee volcanic eruptions and those who gradually leave their homes as soil
quality declines. For Bates "a working denition of environmental refugees includes peo-
ple who migrate from their usual residence due to changes in their ambient non-human
environment". This denition remains necessarily vague in order to incorporate the two
most important features of environmental refugees: the transformation of the environ-
ment to one less suitable for human occupation and the acknowledgment that this causes
migration. The author establishes a classication of environmental refugees according to
the causes of migration. One distinguishes three categories of human migration due to
environmental change: (i) Environmental refugees due to disasters caused by natural or
technological events. Those people are short-term refugees in geographically limited areas.
Natural disasters, which include hurricanes, oods, tornadoes, earthquakes or events that
made a place inhabitable temporarily or permanently are considered, alongside technolog-
ical disasters resulting from human choices, as unintentional migration. (ii)Environmental
refugees due to expropriation of the environment are people who leave their habitat per-
manently to allow land use. The expropriation of the environment can be due on one
hand to economic development such as the construction of hydroelectric dams or roads
and, on the other hand, to warfare and the destruction of the environment, strategically
displacing the population during war incorporating, for instance, land mines. (iii) Envi-
ronmental refugees due to the deterioration of the environment: the migration of these
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people is caused by the anthropogenic degradation of their environment: one talks about
environmental migrants. The e¤ect of environmental degradation ripples through the lo-
cal economy context to a¤ect migration. While disasters and expropriation refugees do
not possess any real means to control environmental change, environmental migrants can
decide the strategies to cope with environmental change.
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A.2 Denition of variables and sources
Variables Denition Source
Net migration
The di¤erence between the total number of emigrants minus the
number of immigrants divided by the person-years lived by the
population
United Nations Population Di-
vision
Low, Medium and High educational mi-
gration rate
Stocks of migrants from sending countries to the 6 key receiv-
ing countries in the OECD (Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
UK, USA) by educational level, divided by the stock of adults
(+25) corresponding to the same educational level, in the country
of origin + The stock of migrants of sending countries.
M. Schi¤ and M.C Sjoblom
(World Bank Databases)
Number of natural disasters Number of natural disasters (a unique disaster number for each
event)
CRED 2010
Number of meteorological disasters
(storm)
Number of events caused by small to meso scale atmospheric
processes (in the spectrum from minutes to days). The main type
of disaster is storms.
CRED 2010
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A.2 Denition of variables and sources: continued
Variables Denition Sources
Number of hydrological disasters Number of events caused by deviations in the normal water cycle
and/or overow of bodies of water caused by wind set-up. The
main types of disaster are ood and wet mass movement
CRED 2010
Meteorological total a¤ected Sum of injured, homeless and a¤ected due to meteorological dis-
asters
CRED 2010
Number of climatological disasters Number of events caused by meso to macro scale processes (in the
spectrum from intra-seasonal to multi-decadal climate variability).
The main type of disasters are extreme temperature, drought and
wildre
CRED 2010
Meteorological damages Estimated damages due to meteorological disasters (given in US$) CRED 2010
Meteorological death Number of persons conrmed as dead and persons missing and
presumed dead due to meteorological disasters
CRED 2010
Hydrological damages Estimated damages due to hydrological disasters (given in US$) CRED 2010
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A.2 Denition of variables and sources: continued
Variables Denition Source
Hydrological death Number of persons conrmed as dead and persons missing and
presumed dead due to hydrological disasters
CRED 2010
Hydrological total a¤ected Sum of injured, homeless and a¤ected due to hydrological disasters CRED 2010
Climatological damages Estimated damages due to climatological disasters (given in US$) CRED 2010
Climatological death Number of persons conrmed as dead and persons missing and
presumed dead due to climatological disasters
CRED 2010
Climatological total a¤ected Sum of injured, homeless and a¤ected due to climatological dis-
asters
CRED 2010
Variables Denition Source
Surface (km2) Countrys total area, including areas under inland bodies of water
and some coastal waterways
Online World bank WDI
GDP per capita Gross Domestic Product per capita Online World bank WDI
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A.2 Denition of variables and sources: continued
Population Total population in the country Online World bank WDI
Young population Percentage of population under 14 years old
Online World bank WDI
Population density Number of inhabitants per km2
Online World bank WDI
Percentage arable area Arable area as percentage of total land area
Online World bank WDI
Political rights Political Rights are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one
representing the highest degree of Freedom and seven the lowest.
Freedom House
Civil war
Dummy variable taking the value 1 for a minimum of 25 battle-
related deaths per year and 0 otherwise.
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict
Dataset
.
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A.3 Summary statistics
Variables Mean Stand. Dev. Min Max N
Net Migration 2.42483 8.77183 -57.1 53.4 435
Low education migration rate 0.01284 0.02832 2.4E-05 0.20826 435
Medium education migration rate 0.04552 0.09323 2.7E-05 0.57908 435
High education migration rate 0.17802 0.20317 0.0003 1 435
Number of natural disasters 7.15172 12.7655 0 109 435
Number of meteorological disasters 1.64138 5.11212 0 37 435
Number of hydrological disasters 2.50345 4.86849 0 40 435
Number of climatological disasters 0.82069 1.22382 0 9 435
Meteorological damages 20974.6 179699 0 2890000 435
Meteorological death 59.7517 736.372 0 15100 435
Meteorological total a¤ected 119574 697671 0 6570000 435
Hydrological damages 35995 337246 0 6720000 435
Hydrological death 70.8966 396,384 0 6303 435
Hydrological total a¤ected 926200 7417160 0 1.27e+08 435
Climatological damages 5422.07 49858.3 0 796000 435
Climatological death 4.7954 37.9428 0 558 435
Climatological total a¤ected 247293 2634030 0 5.00e+07 435
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A.3 Summary statistics: continued
Surface 662654 1880792 2 1.71e+07 435
GDP per capita 658.911 518.964 56.468 3329.86 435
Population 15.0176 2.12587 9.61581 20.9895 435
Young population 42.6959 5.19297 17.5106 51.771 435
Population density 82.2605 128.162 1.21864 1071.17 435
Percentage arable area 13.7488 13.4038 0.04314 70.1928 435
Political rights 4.88046 1.79078 1 7 435
Civil war 0.22069 0.41519 0 1 435
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A.4 Country list
Albania El Salvador Liberia Tanzania
Angola Eritrea Madagascar Thailand
Armenia Ethiopia Malawi Timor-Leste
Azerbaijan Gambia, The Maldives Togo
Bangladesh Georgia Mali Tonga
Belize Ghana Mauritania Tunisia
Benin Guatemala Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Turkmenistan
Bhutan Guinea Moldova Uganda
Bolivia Guinea-Bissau Papua New Guinea Ukraine
Burkina Faso Guyana Paraguay Uzbekistan
Burundi Haiti Philippines Vanuatu
Cambodia Honduras Rwanda Vietnam
Cameroon India Samoa Yemen, Rep.
Cape Verde Indonesia Senegal Zambia
Central African Republic Iran, Islamic Rep. Sierra Leone Zimbabwe
Chad Ivory Coast Solomon Islands
China Jordan Sri Lanka
Comoros Kenya Sudan
Congo, Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Swaziland
Ecuador Lao PDR Syrian Arab Republic
Egypt, Arab Rep. Lesotho Tajikistan
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Chapter 2
"Barcelona or Die":Understanding
Illegal Migration from Senegal
2.1. Introduction
Illegal migration from the developing world to rich countries raises many important
issues at the political, economic and humanitarian levels. Of 214 million migrants in the
world, about 20 to 30 million, i.e. 10 to 15% of migrants, are undocumented. Moreover,
an increase of this proportion is expected in the following years (IOM, 2010)1. Since the
Autumn of 2005, people in Europe have regularly been the witnesses of events related to
illegal migration coming from Africa such as the Ceuta and Melilla tragedy2 or images in
0I am grateful to Jean-Louis Arcand, Andrew Oswald, Alpaslan Akay, Joel Cariole and Ariane Tichit
for valuable comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this chapter. I also thank seminar participants
at CERDI, Clermont-Ferrand; the 8th IZA Annual migration Meeting (AM2) and 3rd Migration Topic
Week at Washinton, DC; CRES, Dakar and IZA, Bonn. The usual disclaimer applies.
1International Organization for Migration
2Ceuta and Melilla are two Spanish enclaves in Morocco. In 2001, the Spanish government constructed
fences to stop illegal migrants crossing these borders. During the Autumn of 2005, many illegal migrants
51
the media of boat-people disembarking on European coasts on news. Such events show
how strongly illegal migrants are motivated to leave their country with the hope of nding
a better life condition. The phenomenon of illegal migration is not new. New methods
of illegal migration are continually being developed to combat tightening immigration
policies in receiving countries. Before 1999, illegal migrants from Africa used to go to
Maghreb countries via the desert in order to reach Europe. Since 1999, tightened border
control at the Straits of Gibraltar has increasingly driven illegal migrant ows to use boats
to reach European coasts such as Lampedusa, Sicily or the Canary Island (De Hass, 2006;
Adepoju and Afrikainstitutet 2008). We are interested in the Senegalese context because
many of these boat-people come from Senegal which has been severely a¤ected by illegal
migration. The motto of thousands of Senegalese migrants who try to migrate illegally
is "Barsa wala Barsakh" which means in Wolof3 "Barcelona4 or Die: we prefer dying by
remaining in Senegal whether we cannot migrate to Europe or to a rich country". To give
an idea of the scope of the phenomenon, among the 30 000 illegal migrants that arrived
in the Canary Islands in 2006 half of them were Senegalese and in the same year, of 7 000
African illegal migrants who died during the crossings almost 1 000 were Senegalese.5
Illegal migration has above all been studied in the context of Mexico and the United
States (see for instance Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999; Hanson, 2006; Orrenius, 2004;
Orrenius and Zavodny, 2005; Gathmann, 2008). Very few studies have been made on
illegal migration from Africa.6 Our main aim in this chapter is to contribute to ll the
mainly coming from Sub-Saharan Africa and trying to reach Spain were killed or injured by border
controllers.
3Wolof is one the main languages spoken in Senegal.
4Barcelona representing here the European Eldorado.
5 Source : Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía, www.apdha.org.
6See for instance, Chiuri et al. (2007) that document the characteristics of illegal migrants by using
a sample of individuals coming among others from African countries and entered Italy illegally during
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gap in the literature by examining the factors related to illegal migration. In other words,
we aim to investigate why some people are willing to risk their lives by trying to migrate
illegally. To understand the mechanisms behind this, we conducted a tailor-made survey in
Senegal from November 2006 to April 2007 and collected a wealth of information about the
intentions and attitudes of people on illegal migration. Our survey also elicits information
on various socio-demographic and economic characteristics of individuals including the
potential destinations and the nancial cost of migration that the individuals perceive.
Since we get intentions, it means that people in our sample who are willing to migrate
legally or illegally are potential migrants who could realize their plan and migrate in the
future as well as they could stay in Senegal and never migrate. In both cases intentions of
potential migrants give an indication of their motivations. Social psychology theories such
as the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) and the theory of planned
behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen,1988) argue that intentions are the rst determinant and a
good predictor of behavior. According to Ajzen (1991, p.181), "Intentions are assumed
to capture motivational factors that inuence behavior; they are indications of how hard
people are willing to try, of how much of an e¤ort they are planning to exert in order to
perform behavior". These theories claim that a strong intention has a high probability
to be transformed into behavior if the individual evaluates a positive self-performance of
a particular behavior (this condition is called attitudes toward behavior), perceives that
social norms are favorable to this behavior (subjective norms) and is able to perceive the
di¢culty to perform this behavior (perceived behavioral control). However, Manski (1990)
argues that intentions data have to be used carefully because they may not necessarily
2003. In the particular case of Senegal, Fall (2007) and Mbow (2008) made some sociological studies
about this issue.
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predict behaviour. The mismatch between intention and behaviour can be due to the
di¤erences between information available when the intention is formulated and when
the behavior is determined. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) also claim being careful
about using subjective variables but at the same time they specify that these variables
are useful for explaining di¤erences in behavior accross individuals. Moreover, in the
eld of migration, Dalen and Henkens (2008) show that migration intentions are a good
predictor of future migration ows. In the case of illegal migration, we argue that it is
important to have some evidence using intentions data. Intentions of migration and of
illegal migration in particular are a good indicator of how people are frustrated with the
life condition in their country of origin. Moreover, in general illegal migrants become no
more observable once they arrived in the host country without being apprehended. Then,
intentions data are valuable in this specic case because they help to elicit motivations
and to have a better comprehension of this phenomenon which is useful, for example, to
adapt migration policies both in the sending and the receiving countries. It is therefore
important to know how these intentions to migrate illegally are formed.
From data in our survey, we estimate various simple probit models to examine the
determinants of the probability that an individual will choose to migrate illegally. We are
rst interested in the relationship between individual characteristics and the willingness
to migrate illegally. We later examine the role of illegal migration prices, expectations,
relatives who have already migrated and tight immigration policies on the willingness of
individuals to migrate illegally.
Our results can be summarized as follows: rst, illegal migrants are willing to accept a
substantial risk of death (25% at the median) and tend to be young, single and with a low
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level of education. Second, high illegal migration prices are negatively correlated with the
likelihood to migrate illegally. This result suggests that the poorest are not able to migrate
illegally. Third, biased expectations of potential migrants play an important role in the
intention to migrate illegally. This result highlights the fact that people may base a risky
decision on wrong information. Fourth, there is a positive relationship between migrant
networks and illegal migration intentions which may be due to the fact that relatives who
have already migrated help to reduce the costs associated with illegal migration to the
host country and furthermore can sometimes give a less than accurate information of their
living conditions which serves to increase the desire of potential illegal migrants. Fifth,
tight immigration policies may not be e¤ective because they deter more potential legal
migrants than potential illegal migrants. Sixth, some particular destinations are more
correlated with illegal migration than others. Historical links, cultural proximity and
language matter less in the choice of the destination country of potential illegal migrants.
The remaining part of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section presents
the existing literature on migration intentions and triggering factors of illegal migration
such as expectations, networks, tight immigration policies and migration cost. Section
2.3 presents the data and descriptive statistics obtained from our survey. The estima-
tion strategy and the empirical results are presented in Section 2.4 whereas Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2. Literature
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the intentions to migrate illegally. We draw
on literature on this topic and on some triggering factors such as expectations, migrant
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networks, immigration policies and migration costs7 that we think play an important role
in the willingness to migrate illegally.
The determinants of migration intentions have already been studied in the literature.
Migration intentions are driven by certain socio-demographic factors such as gender, age,
level of education, place of origin of migrants or the presence of friends and relatives in
the destination place (Dalen et al., 2005a; Fouarge and Ester, 2007; Zaiceva and Zim-
mermann, 2008; Burda, 1993; Epstein and Gang, 2006). Moreover, intentions to migrate
are determined by the economic conditions in the country of origin such as the level of
income inequality (Liebig and Souza-Poza, 2004) or the social conditions in the receiving
country such as the level of xenophobia (Friebel et al., 2011).
It is also shown in the literature that migration intentions are often motivated by great
expectations towards the living standards at the destination (Dalen et al., 2005a; de Jong,
2000). These high expectations are often unrealistic and can lead to a negative migration
experience (Knight and Gunatilaka, 2010; Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2009). Nevertheless,
there is no consensus in the literature about the role of expectations regarding migration;
some studies argue that the role of over expectations on migration decision needs to be
put into perspective. For instance, McKenzie et al. (2012) nd that contrary to the
general understanding suggesting that over expectations increase the pressure to migrate,
potential male migrants from Tonga to New Zealand underestimate both their likelihood
to nd a job and their earnings. The main explanation underlining this is that these mi-
grants form their expectations on information given by old cohorts of migrants. They also
nd that conditional to the size of the network those having relatives such as uncles or
7The role of migration costs on the intention to migrate can be explained through the role of expec-
tations, networks and immigration policies.
56
cousins in New Zealand are more misinformed. These people expect lower earnings than
those having no relatives or close family in New Zealand.8 In our chapter, we also measure
income expectations and how they a¤ect the willingness of individuals to migrate. We use
a direct question by asking to potential migrants "How much are you expecting to earn
each month in the destination country?" It is important to note that our measure for ex-
pectations di¤ers from the measure of McKenzie et al. (2012). These authors measure the
probabilistic expectations of migrants by estimating the quantiles and moments of inter-
est from the subjective distribution of earnings in the destination country conditional on
working. But even though we do not use the same measure of expectations, it is very likely
in the specic context of Senegal to assume some over expectations of migration returns
from potential migrants. Historical, sociological and economic factors can explain our
assumption. First of all, Senegal has a long tradition of migration in West Africa and also
in Europe. Senegal provided "Tirailleurs"9 to France during the First World War (Riccio,
2005; 2008). From the sixties, Senegalese migration to France was mainly explained by the
need for workers in the reconstruction in France (Riccio, 2005;2008; Manchuelle, 1997).
According to Fall (2003), international migration from Senegal to Northern countries has
been growing since the eighties. This trend has accelerated with new destinations, such
as Italy or Spain which raise a great interest since the coming of the "Modou-Modou".
This term at rst referred to seasonal workers looking for supplementary incomes in big
cities such as Dakar. Since the beginning of the nineties, it has applied to all Senegalese
international migrants. It was at this moment that Senegalese migration ows increased
8According to Mckenzie et al. (2012), migrants lower and do not reveal the real amount that they
earn in order to reduce the pressure regarding remittances coming from their extended family.
9Tirailleurs sénégalais is a generic term to design Sub-Saharan Africa soldiers who belonged to the
French Colonial Army.
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considerably, in particular due to the degradation of the economic context. Second, in
Africa and more specically in Senegal many households with good life conditions have
one or many family members who have migrated. Migrants send remittances10 and invest
in buildings, business and social services for the community (Beauchemin and Shoumaker,
2009; Melly, 2011; Kane, 2002; Diatta and Mbow, 1999). These transfers and investments
give them an important economic power and signal a better life abroad which a¤ects the
intentions and expectations of individuals belonging to the non-migrant families in the
local communities (Dalen et al., 2005b). Third, remittances demonstrate family attache-
ment and testify to a successfull migration. They allow to the migrant family to signal
success, for instance, through the construction of private houses or at family celebrations
(Riccio, 2005; 2008). This would generate deprivation feeling among other members in
the community who aspire to similar standards of living and who may be motivated to
migrate illegally due to the high social pressure of having a lower social status.
Migrant networks, particularly family and friends relatives who have already migrated
legally or illegally, are considered as another trigger of illegal migration. The literature
shows that migrant networks are the main source of information and a demonstrative
example. Migrant networks measured as the stock of migrants in the host country are
a crucial determinant of migration ows and of their variability (Perdersen et al., 2008;
Beine et al., 2011). These networks contribute to a reduction in the various costs related to
10We could also refer here to the role that the relative deprivation of individuals in their community
plays on migration (Runciman, 1966; Stark and Taylor, 1989). Remittances sent to the migrants family
increase the desire to migrate of non-migrants families by changing the income distribution and by creating
inequalities that can induce a higher propensity to migrate (Stark, 2006; Stark et al., 2009). Moreover,
remittances associated with migration help to reinforce the social status of the migrants family in the
community (Azam and Gubert, 2005). Moreover, in Sub-Saharan Africa, Senegal is one of the main
recipient countries of remittances which represent 9.3% of GDP (Ratha et al., 2011).
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migration (Carrington et al., 1996; Winters et al., 2001, Munshi, 2003; Bauer et al., 2005).
This is particularly true for the most vulnerable population. For instance, Mckenzie and
Rapaport (2007) nd that a small network increases inequalities because only households
from the middle-class and the upper-class can bear migration costs. However, a larger
network induces lower migration costs which reduces inequality and the possibility for
poorer households to migrate. In the case of illegal migration, literature also suggests
that migrant networks play an important role in the decision to migrate illegally (Hanson,
2006). Studies of illegal migration from Mexico to the U.S. nd that networks help
individuals to get assistance to nd a job more easily, to learn the information about
how to cross the borders illegally and to obtain the nancial cost of migration through
informal credit mechanisms between individuals (Massey and Espinoza, 1997; Singer and
Massey, 1998; Orrenius and Zavodny, 2005; Doln and Genicot, 2010).
We also assume that tight immigration policies in the destination countries a¤ect the
intention to migrate illegally. The illegal migration market works as a "classical market"
that suggests a negative correlation between the price of illegal migration and illegal mi-
grants ows. One the one hand, a tight border enforcement increases the likelihood of
being apprehended which raises illegal migration prices. These higher illegal migration
prices decrease in turn the demand for smugglers services (Singer and Massey, 1998;
Gathman, 2008). On the other hand, stricter immigration policies often have some per-
nicious e¤ect on illegal migration. For instance Orrenius (2004) and Gathman (2008)
show that border enforcement actually worsens the situation by playing into the hands of
smugglers who raise their prices. Moreover, stricter border controls force illegal migrants
to change their itinerary which makes their journey longer and more dangerous. Finally,
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these authors conclude that only a small deterring e¤ect is achieved by the enforcement
of border controls between Mexico and the U.S.. More restrictive immigration policies
decrease the inows of illegal migrants. However, at the same time illegal migrants that
have to face higher migration costs increase their migration duration in the host country
which makes the net e¤ect on migration ows unclear (Angelucci, 2012; Borodak and
Miniscloux, 2009). This unclear e¤ect is also related to the type of immigration poli-
cies. Friebel and Guriev (2006) argue that stricter deportation policies increase illegal
migration ows and negatively a¤ect the skill composition of immigrants whereas stricter
border controls decrease the overall ows of immigrants and contribute to develop the
debt contracts between intermediaries and illegal migrants.
The choice of destination country can also explain the method of migration to a coun-
try and can be used as a proxy for expectations, migrant relatives, migration prices and
immigration policies. Intuitively, migration prices depend on the destination. The loca-
tion choice of immigrants is highly correlated with the income opportunities (Konseiga,
2007; Mayda, 2010, Ortega and Peri, 2012); the presence of migrant networks (Jaeger,
2000; Chiswick et al., 2005; Epstein, 2002; Bauer et al., 2005; Epstein and Gang, 2006);
the geographical proximity but also the social proximity measured by the language prox-
imity or the ethnic background (Fafchamps and Shilpi, 2013). It is also shown in the
literature that immigration policies inuence the choice of the destination country (Pena,
2009; Bertoli et al; 2011). For instance, Ortega and Peri (2012) nd that a tightening of
entry laws decreases migrant ows to a country just one year after their application.
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2.3. Data
2.3.1. The Survey
In order to examine the intentions and possible triggering factors of illegal migration we
conducted a tailor-made survey in Senegal. This study was conducted in Dakar and was
exploratory. It does not allow us to generalize our results to all the Senegalese population.
However, since illegal migration from Africa has not been greatly studied, the original data
set obtained from this survey can help to ll the gap in the literature and give us the
opportunity to understand this phenomenon further.
A random sample of individuals was interviewed between November 2006 and April
2007. Prior to the main survey, a pilot study is conducted to be able to adjust for possible
biases.11 There are four sections of the survey: rst, we elicit a wealth of information
about the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the individuals. Second, we
elicit the willingness or intentions of individuals to migrate legally or illegally and the
motivations behind it. Third, the individuals are asked a detailed battery of questions
about the preferred destinations. Fourth, we are interested in the willingness of the
individuals to risk their lives or to take nancial risks, for example, by paying a smuggler.
The sampling design was made considering various diversities in Dakar simultaneously.
400 randomly chosen individuals were interviewed in di¤erent neighborhoods. The survey
was conducted in major ve regions of Dakar. The rst one is the University Campus
and its surroundings. Many people belonging to the middle class live in this neighbor-
hood. The second neighborhood is Fass, Medina and Geule-Tapee and the third one is
Guediawaye. The second and the third regions are mainly some popular neighborhoods.
11See Appendix A.1 for the details of the questionnaire.
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The fourth level of randomization is Sandaga which is one of the main areas shopping in
the city center. Many people coming from the rural sector work there. For some of them,
Dakar is the nal destination but for many the city is a temporary place for preparing
further migration by working in low-paying jobs. Finally, the fth region was the main
departure beaches for illegal migrants namely Kayar, Thiaroye, Yarakh and Yo¤. Since
our aim is to explain the illegal migration intentions, the stratication is made in order
to identify people having a high propensity to migrate. Consequently, we did not include
rich regions in Dakar because it is very unlikely that people living in these neighborhoods
have to consider migration and illegal migration in particular.12
In our survey, we ask people directly: "Are you willing to migrate?" to measure their
intentions. 92% of our sample, i.e. 367 individuals, answer yes (Table 2.1). We focus our
analysis on individuals willing to attempt legal or illegal migration. To those who wish
to migrate we ask the question: "If you are not able to migrate legally, are you willing to
migrate illegally?"13 Among the 367 individuals who wish to migrate 222 report that they
would be able to only migrate legally and 145 report that they would be able to migrate
illegally.
The proportion of people who consider migration is high (92%) and needs to be dis-
cussed. We have some variation across regions where we conducted the survey and the
12These people are in most cases highly educated, much wealthier than the average population and
have good life conditions in Senegal. Moreover, when they have to go abroad they are able to provide
reliable documents to consular o¢cials and do not have an issue with travelling legally.
13We ask the question in this form, because we assume that if people have the opportunity to migrate
legally they will naturally go towards this type of migration. In the Senegalese context, it is very likely that
people attempting illegal migration have the perceptions that, because of their low level of qualications,
the instability or the weakness of their professional situation, obtaining legitimate documents would be
di¢cult for them. Attempting legal migration would be a waste of time and therefore, they will restrict
themselves to ask for legal documents.
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proportion of people who wish to migrate is high in all these areas. First of all, it does
not mean that all these people will attempt migration. However, some of them will do
so. As mentioned above, we measure the intentions of people and we call them potential
migrants. In fact, this high number is a very strong indication of the degree of frustration
about the economic conditions faced by the average Senegalese individual.
2.3.2. Statistics
[TABLE 2.1 HERE]
Table 2.1 gives the summary statistics.14 Men represent 88% of our sample. This
proportion is the same for potential legal and illegal migrants. People reachable in the
di¤erent neighborhoods were mainly male which is consistent with our aim to reach the
population that can have a high intention to migrate. Migration in Senegal is indeed
a phenomenon that mainly a¤ects men. In our sample, there is no di¤erence between
men and women in the willingness to migrate illegally. The average age is 26 years old
and the average age of potential illegal migrants is slightly lower (24 years) than that of
potential legal migrants (27 years). The proportion of married people among potential
legal migrants represents the double (32%) of that among potential illegal migrants (17%).
This suggests a negative correlation between the marital status and the intention of illegal
migration. 75% of people interviewed have at least one adult male as dependent and more
than 80% of them have at least one male child, one female child or one female adult as
dependent. These proportions are higher for potential legal migrants than for potential
illegal migrants. The average level of education is the secondary level and 27% of people
14See Appendix A.2 for the denition of the variables.
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have reached this level. But it is interesting to see that 55% of potential illegal migrants
have a low level of education whereas they represent 33% of potential legal migrants.
Only 5% of potential illegal migrants have a university level which is ve times less than
in the population of potential legal migrants. 57% of people live in a house that belongs
to them or to their family. This gure does not vary much according to the legal or illegal
consideration of migration. Among the potential illegal migrants we nd more people
belonging to the Mouride brotherhood15 (54%) than among the potential legal migrants
(39%). This religious dummy may therefore play a role in the willingness to migrate
illegally.
The average monthly wage in Senegal approximated by monthly expenditure16 is esti-
mated at 73 604 Fcfa (112 Euros) for potential illegal migrants and is slightly lower than
potential legal migrants (77 684 Fcfa i.e. 118 euros). The expected wages are much higher
both for potential legal and illegal migrants. However, the average amount given by the
rst one is higher (1.850.505 Fcfa i.e. 2821 Euros) than the amount given by the second
one (1 141 931 Fcfa, i.e. 1739 Euros). Potential illegal migrants have on average more rel-
atives (86%) than potential legal migrants (66%). 79% of potential illegal migrants report
that they will not give up on migration if there is a tightening of immigration policies in
the destination countries whereas the gure is less among potential legal migrants (62%).
Our summary statistics show that the preferred destinations of potential illegal migrants
are in the rst position Spain, followed by Italy, in the third position the U.S. and France
15Mouride is a dummy equal to 1 if people belong to this religious brotherhood. Senegal is composed
of 94% of Muslim people, 5% of Christian people and 1% of Animist people. A lot of Muslim people are
a¢liated to di¤erent brotherhoods headed by a spiritual guide and Mouride is one of the most important
brotherhoods in Senegal.
16Expenditure are considered more reliable and less biased than the level of the income because people
answer more readily about this variable.
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comes in the fourth position. 41% of potential illegal migrants prefer Spain versus only
18% for potential legal migrants and 26% of potential illegal migrants prefer Italy versus
15% of potential legal migrants. Whereas 16% of potential illegal migrants prefer the U.S.
versus 31% of potential legal migrants and 3% of potential illegal migrants prefer France
versus 16% among potential legal migrants. The method of migration appears then also
di¤erent according to the choice of the destination country.
[TABLE 2.2 HERE]
During the survey, we observed that there are three ways to migrate. The rst method
consists in going legally by applying directly for a legal visa and paying the airfare. This
is what we call the "visa method". The second method is called "canoe method". It
involves paying a fee to a smuggler and using boats or routes towards Maghreb countries
in order to attempt to get into various destination countries illegally often Spain, Italy or
France. Finally the third method is called the "embassy method". It consists in corrupting
someone who is linked to consular sections in Dakar to get legitimate documents. We
consider the "canoe" and the "embassy" methods as illegal. For a given destination
country, we have also the responses of our sample of potential migrants concerning the
prices of di¤erent migration methods. Table 2.1 shows the average price of all destinations
for each method of migration. Due to the nature of the type of journey o¤ered by the
"canoe method", its probability of success is much lower than with the embassy method.
Therefore, the price of this method is lowest (419 090 Fcfa i.e. 638 euros on average for
all the destinations) than the embassy method (3 071 603 Fcfa, i.e. 4678 Euros) that
gets the same probability of success as the legal method. According to the answers of
the interviewed people, the visa method price is on average equal to 829 785 Fcfa, i.e.
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1264 Euros. Table 2.2 presents the average prices for each method of migration and
each destination country. These prices are reported directly by potential migrants who
generally have good information on the illegal migration prices. We compare these prices
with the ones given by press reports, discussions with some migrants, people who have
made some attempts. They correspond to the real prices in the market except for the
"visa method". The "visa method 1" corresponds to the response of potential migrants
and the "visa method 2" corresponds to the prices calculated from the average cost of the
airfare according to the destination country added to the visa fees. For most individuals
the likelihood of migrating legally is low which implies that they are misinformed about
the legal market and they do not know the real "visa method" price.
[FIGURE 2.1 HERE]
77% of potential illegal migrants reported that they are willing to risk their life in
order to migrate. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of their probabilities of death. When
we asked them how likely they were to die if they tried to illegally migrate to the preferred
destination, potential illegal migrants reported that they are willing to accept a 25% risk
of death at the median, which is substantial. These gures illustrate the attitudes of
illegal migrants towards risk and are demontrative of their strong determination to leave
their home country whatever the risks.
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2.4. Econometric analysis and Results
2.4.1. Model specication
Our main interest is to explore the relation between various characteristics and the like-
lihood of illegal migration intentions. In order to examine empirically this we estimate
various simple probit models. The estimation function is specied as follows:
(2.1) mi =
8><
>:
1 if xiC + zi + Br + Fi > 0
0 if xiC + zi + Br + Fi  0
Where mi is the binary dependent variable equal to one if the individual i reports a
possibility for illegal migration and 0 otherwise; xi is the vector of socio-demographic and
economic characteristics such as the logarithm of the monthly wage earned in Senegal
per capita, approximated by the average monthly expenditure of the individuals divided
by the number of dependents17, gender, age, marital status, education level, gender of
dependent children (dummy equal to one if the individual has male or female dependent
child), gender of dependent adults (dummy equal to one if the individual has male or
female dependent adult), home occupation status (dummy equal to one if the individual
and his family live in their own home) and indicator variables for religion and ethnic
groups. C is the vector of parameters to be estimated.
17We divided the average monthly expenditure of the individuals by 1+ the number of dependents
and also the foreign expected wage by 1 + the number of dependents to take into account the burden of
responsibilities that may inuence the way to migrate.
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Equation (2.1) also includes another vector of variables zi that we will included in
the estimation to investigate the hypotheses discussed in the second section. These vari-
ables are related to the prices of migration, expectations of migrants, migrant networks
(proxied by the existing relatives of migrants abroad), immigration policies and choice of
destination.  is the vector of parameters to be estimated for these variables. As men-
tioned in the third section, there are mainly ve regions in Dakar where we collected our
data. In order to capture unobserved regional characteristics, we control equation (2.1)
for ve regional dummies (Br). Additionally, the error term Fi is assumed to be normally
distributed with zero mean and unit variance due to identication.
2.4.2. Main Results
In this section we present how standard socio-demographic and economic characteristics
of individuals are correlated with the probability to migrate illegally. The results of
estimates are presented in Table 2.3.
[TABLE 2.3 HERE]
The variable "married" is signicantly di¤erent from 0 at a level of 1% and negative
in all specications (Column 1 to Column 4). Therefore, being married decreases the
probability to migrate illegally compared with a non-married individual. The main reason
is that married people have more familial responsibilities and ties and are less willing to
take risks compared to single people. The consequences of attempted illegal migration will
not only a¤ect them directly but they will also have some e¤ects on their close relatives
such as their spouses.
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The variable age is signicant at a level of 5% and negative. Younger is an individual
higher is his likelihood to migrate illegally. Young people are less risk averse than elderly
people (see for instance Dohmen et al., 2005). Then, regarding the nancial risk and the
high uncertainty related to illegal migration, it is very likely to nd more young people
among potential illegal migrants.18
The dummy "Mouride" is positive and signicant which means that belonging to this
brotherhood increases the propensity to migrate illegally relative to the other religious
category. There are two main explanations of this e¤ect: rst, historically and culturally
"Mouride" people are great travelers. Moreover, the work ethic is very important in their
vision and they are known to be hard workers. In their ideology, it is important to nd a
job where it is possible. Second, and it is probably the main reason, relatives are essential
in the Senegalese migrants socialization (Fall, 1998) and "Mouride" people constitute
an important religious group with a big network abroad. This is an illustration of the
network e¤ect on the illegal issue that we are going to develop and specify in the second
part of the empirical analysis.
In Column 2, the logarithm of the monthly wage earned in Senegal per capita has a
positive sign but it is not signicant. This variable is considered as a push factor but it
does not a¤ect the likelihood to migrate illegally. The level of income in Senegal is then
not su¢cient to explain illegal migration.
In Column 3, we introduce the level of education and in Column 4 we introduce both
the logarithm of the monthly wage earned in Senegal per capita and the level of educa-
tion as explanatory variables. Our results concerning the level of education show that the
18We also run the estimates with the variable age and its squared but we did not nd any signicance
of this variable.
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higher the education level of the individual the less is his willingness to migrate illegally.
In other words, highly educated people have a reduced probability to form intentions
for illegal migration which suggests a negative selection of illegal migrants in the case
of Senegal.19 People who have a secondary or a higher level of education, respectively
decrease by 12.4% and 33.2% (Column 4) their probability to attempt illegal migration
compared with those who just have a low level of education. Educated people have more
opportunities to nd a good job, to get out of poverty and above all to get legitimate
documents and to migrate legally. According to Chiswick (1999), visa rationing due to
migration restriction can be based on selection criteria such as education or the qualica-
tions of migrants and inuences a positive self-selection of migrants which enhances their
labor market success. But this favorable self-selection of migrants is less important for
illegal migrants who often have a low education level. Moreover, illegal migrants because
of the risk of apprehension and deportation tend to invest in very little human capital.
Gender has a positive sign but it is not signicant. The dummies for the gender
and the age of dependent people are not signicant. Living in a house owned by the
individual or his family has a negative sign in all estimates which means that it decreases
the willingness to migrate illegally but the result is not robust when we control for the
logarithm of the monthly wage per capita earned in Senegal.
19In the literature there are essentially two visions about the selection of migrants according to their
education level. Borjas (1987) argues that there is a negative selection in poor countries where the
less skilled have a higher propensity to migrate whereas Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) and Orrenius and
Zavodny (2005) nd a positive or an intermediate selection on observable characteristics of education level
of Mexican migrants. Orrenius and Zavodny (2005), for instance, show that changes in the migration
determinants a¤ect the self-selection of undocumented workers from Mexico to the U.S.. According to
these authors, better economic conditions in the U.S. and in Mexico lead to the migration of low-skilled
undocumented workers whereas bad economic conditions in Mexico and stricter border enforcement are
associated with a higher positive selection among Mexican migrants.
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2.5. Discussion
In this part, we examine more deeply the relation between the socio-demographic and
economic characteristics and illegal migration intentions and we analyze the role of the
triggering factors which are discussed in Section 2.2. We study how the price of migration,
expectations, immigration policies and presence of relatives in the destination countries
are correlated with the illegal migration intentions of people in Senegal.
2.5.1. Prices of Illegal Migration
[TABLE 2.4 HERE]
Table 2.4 presents the estimates of the average price according to the destination
country of the visa method 1,20 the canoe method, the embassy method and all the prices
without any distinction about the method of migration. For each method of migration,
the price is calculated as the average price for each destination. The variable migration
prices represents the entirety for all the destinations and without any distinction about the
method of migration. These regressions control for all variables used in the specications
above. The variable log visa price (Column 1) is positive but not signicantly di¤erent
from 0. For people who are willing to migrate illegally the legal price will not inuence
their decision because it is very likely that these individuals know their low probability of
getting legitimate documents due to their socio-economic characteristics. Then, a high or
a low legal price would not be a key element of their willingness to migrate illegally. The
price of illegal migration methods namely the canoe method (Column 2) and the embassy
20We use in the estimates the average price of each destination of the visa method 1 instead of the
visa method 2 because it is on this price that individuals will base their willingness to migrate.
71
method (Column 3) are signicant and negative. However, when we put these both prices
together (Column 4) the variable log canoe price remains negative but not signicant.
One can assume that in the illegal migration market the levels of price of one illegal
method will inuence the levels of price of the other. The negative relationship between
the price of illegal migration and the willingness to migrate illegally can be explained
by the fact that migration and illegal migration in particular are expensive for people
from the working class or even for a Senegalese from the middle class. The price of the
embassy method for instance is highly expensive and very discouraging for the poorest
illegal migration candidates. The result of illegal migration prices is conrmed in Column
5 where we look at the role of all migration prices without any distinction about the
method of migration. This variable has also a strong negative e¤ect on the willingness to
migrate illegally.
2.5.2. Expectations
[TABLE 2.5 HERE]
Columns 1 and 4 of Table 2.5 show the role of expectations measured by the log
of the expected monthly foreign wage per capita on the likelihood to migrate illegally.
A higher expected wage in the destination country per capita is positively correlated
with the consideration about illegal migration. This supports the hypothesis that high
expectations lead to an increased willingness to migrate illegally. We argue that these
expectations are often based on the perceptions of migrants about the earnings of their
family and friends relatives living abroad.
[FIGURE 2.2 HERE]
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[FIGURE 2.3 HERE ]
[FIGURE 2.4 HERE ]
Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 compare the distributions of expected monthly foreign wages
and the perceptions of family and friends relatives wages with potential illegal migrants,
potential legal migrants and the whole sample of potential migrants. In the three cases
we can see that both distributions are similar. When we look at the comparison between
the expected foreign wages of potential illegal migrants and their perceptions of family
and friends relatives wages (Figure 2.2), it appears that the expectations of potential
illegal migrants are very close to their perceptions even if they are lower. The average
expected monthly wage of illegal migrants is equal to 1 141 931 Fcfa (1740 Euros) and
their median expected monthly wage is 800 000 Fcfa (1218 Euros).21 For all potential
migrants the average relatives monthly wage is estimated at 1 305 055 Fcfa, i.e. about
1991 Euros whereas their expected monthly wage is estimated at 1 567 466 Fcfa, i.e. about
2390 Euros.22 On average, potential migrants in general and potential legal migrants in
particular expect to earn more than their relatives who have migrated before.
21For example, according to the French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE), the monthly average
available income for a French household (composed of one individual) from the middle class is estimated
between 1100 Euros and 1600 Euros in 2006. The median living standards is estimated at 1470 Euros
per month and 50% of French households have a monthly available income lower than 2260 Euros.
Sources:http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/detail.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=ir-
erfs2006&page=irweb/erfs2006/dd/erfs2006_men.htm#ERFS2006-AN-MEN-DIS
http://www.insee.fr/fr/¤c/docs_¤c/ref/revpmen09b.PDF
22The gap between the expected wages of potential legal migrants and their perceptions is more
important than for potential illegal migrants. Potential legal migrants expect to earn more than their
relatives (Figure 2.3). This is due to the fact that illegal migrants are aware of their condition of illegality
and know that they will earn less compared to a situation where they would be legal migrants.
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2.5.3. Networks and information
Many respondents already have relatives in their preferred destination country and have an
idea concerning the wages that they earn. The variable relatives is a dummy equal to one
if the individual has members of his family, close friends or relatives who have migrated.
The relatives and more largely the migrant networks increase the willingness to migrate
illegally (Table 2.5, Column 2 and Column 4). The information about expected foreign
wages often comes from the perceptions of migrants about their relatives earnings. Family
and friends relatives have a positive inuence on the willingness to migrate illegally. They
help to reduce migration costs but they also give a certain standard of living to their family
left behind, they give them information about life abroad which may be true or not and
can let them believe that success is guaranteed with migration.
2.5.4. Migration Policies
The variable tightening of immigration policies is a dummy equal to 1 if the potential
migrant does not give up on migration if the immigration policies in the host countries
are tight. A tightening of immigration policies means that the conditions to enter the host
countries are made more di¢cult and more restrictive. These conditions can be related to
the quotas of immigrants, their level of education, their skills or to stricter border controls
of the host countries. This variable has a signicant and positive sign (Table 2.5 Column
3 and 4) which means that tight immigration policies for entering host countries have a
counterintuitive e¤ect on the propensity to migrate illegally. It deters more those who are
willing to migrate legally than potential illegal migrants. This result suggests that tight
74
immigration policies may be less e¢cient and can incite potential migrants to turn to
illegal methods such as paying a smuggler or corrupting o¢cials to get legal documents.
2.5.5. Destinations
[TABLE 2.6 HERE]
Destinations dummies are used to look at the role of the choice of the preferred destina-
tion country on the willingness to migrate illegally. We replace the four interest variables
by countries dummies because the choice of the destination countries mainly depends on
the opportunities, the possibility of nding a job and therefore on the expected wage in
the host country, the presence of relatives who have migrated to this country and the
perception of the exibility of the immigration policies in the host country. We exclude
the migration prices which are estimated according to the destinations to avoid a multico-
linearity issue. Results in Table 2.6 show that people who desire to go to Spain (Column
1) or Italy Column (2) have a higher likelihood of migrating illegally. People who have as
preferred destination countries the U.S. (Column 3), France (Column 4), or the United
Kingdom (Column 5) have a lower probability to migrate illegally.23 There are many
explanations for these results. First, Spain and Italy are geographically more accessible
and therefore less expensive than France or the U.S. by using illegal methods such as the
"Canoe method". For instance, Hanson (2006) argues that the geographical proximity
between the U.S. and Mexico makes illegal migration between those two countries easier.
The second explanation is the size of the migrants network which is very large in those two
countries. OECD statistics (2010)24 show that the inows of Senegalese people in Spain
23Canada (Column 6) and the destination Other (Column 7) are not signicant.
24www.stats.oecd.org
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and Italy have increased between 2006 and 2009 whereas they have remained stable in
France.25 Finally, the third likely reason is the perception of di¤erent immigration policies
by migrants. For illegal migrants historical links, cultural proximity and language have
less importance in the choice of the destination country. Indeed, despite historical and
cultural links between France and Senegal, 26 many individuals report during the survey
that the political line on migration to France is more di¢cult.27 If migrants have the
choice between di¤erent countries they will choose the one with less restrictive immigra-
tion policies and where it is easier to enter. It does not necessarily mean that these people
will give up on migrating illegally. Our results are similar to those of Orrenius (2004) and
Gathman (2008). In fact, these authors argue that stricter border control changes the
place of crossing and in our case we nd that stricter migration policies for entering
host countries can modify the choice of the destination countries without eliminating the
willingness to migrate illegally.
2.6. Conclusion
The novelty of this chapter is twofold. First of all, it presents results from a tailor-made
survey among the potential migrants in Senegal. Second, it investigates how the intentions
25According to Banerjee (1992) and Epstein (2002) we can assimilate this type of behavior by herd
behavior. Decision makers who are the migrants in our case base their willingness on information given
by the acts of previous decision makers represented by relatives in the host countries. These migrants
would act di¤erently if they had private information. Moreover, illegal and unskilled migrants are more
dependent of network externalities than legal and skilled migrants (Epstein, 2002; Bauer et al., 2007).
26For instance, France is a destination preferred by students who are largely legal migrants.
27The tightening of French immigration policies these last years has increased the interest for other
destinations such as Spain or Italy (Fall, 2003). If we compare and replace in the context of 2006 and
2007 Spain, for instance, sorted out illegal migrants ve times between 1985 and 2004 with the increase in
labor demand due to the economic boom. The legitimization of illegal migrants could therefore generate
additional ows and be a supplementary motivation for people remaining in the country of origin and
desiring to migrate. Of course, since the beginning of the economic crisis of 2008 and even before then
the situation was di¤erent in Spain and Italy.
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or motivations of people are formed regarding the decision to migrate illegally . We
rst analyze the relation between the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of
potential migrants and their propensity to consider migrating illegally. We later examine
the channels of how the price of migration, the expected foreign wage, the potential
migrant networks and tight immigration policies a¤ect illegal migration considerations.
Our results show that potential illegal migrants are willing to accept a substantial
risk of death (25% at the median) and tend to be young, single and with a low level of
education. The price of illegal migration is negatively correlated with the illegal migra-
tion intention which suggests that the poorest are not able to migrate illegally. Biased
expectations towards the popular destination countries increase the likelihood to migrate
illegally. Consequently, people may base a risky decision on wrong information. There is
a positive relationship between migrant networks and illegal migration intentions which
may be due to the fact that relatives who have already migrated give a true or false
picture of their living conditions that can increase the desire of potential illegal migrants.
We also nd that contrary to the initial objectives a tightening of immigration policies
for entering host countries deter more legal than illegal potential migrants. Finally, some
particular destinations such as Spain or Italy are more attractive and more correlated
with the likelihood of migrating illegally from Senegal than is France, the U.S. or United
Kingdom. Historical links, cultural proximity and language matter less in the choice of
the destination country.
As we report in this chapter, illegal migration starts rst in thoughts. It is the result
of the belief that success is only possible abroad. In order to reduce illegal migration ows
and to develop more e¢cient immigration policies in Europe, solutions have to be entered
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in a long-term perspective by integrating both recipient and sending countries and above
all by being more focused on the formation of intentions that are the rst step of an
illegal migration project. In the Senegalese case, a radical change is necessary in the way
of thinking and viewing migration as the unique way to succeed. In order to accomplish
these goals it would be very relevant to improve the absolute income but it would be
not su¢cient if it does not reduce frustration and feelings of injustice. Some awareness
campaign on the real living conditions of many migrants in the host country could be
useful to relativize the situation of non migrants and allow them to take decisions using
correct information. It would be also helpful to promote better governance and more trust
in the ability of the leaders of the country of origin to create good conditions of success.
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Table 2.1. Summary statistics
Variables Legal migration Illegal migration Total
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Expected foreign wage 1 850 505 7 008 376 1 141 931 1 158 843 1 567 466 5 486 186
Expected foreign wage
per capita
1 089 245 6 829 681 600 252.9 1 021 903 893 918 5 332 343
Wage 77 684.68 66 006.94 73 604.35 62 840.70 76 054.93 64 698.93
Wage per capita 20 678.40 15 647.79 22 690.14 18 800.45 21 481.92 16 979.35
Tightening of immigra-
tion policies
0.62 0.49 0.79 0.41 0.68 0.47
Relatives 0.66 0.48 0.88 0.33 0.74 0.44
Spain 0.18 0.39 0.41 0.49 0.27 0.44
Italy 0.15 0.36 0.26 0.44 0.19 0.39
US 0.31 0.46 0.16 0.37 0.25 0.43
France 0.15 0.36 0.03 0.16 0.10 0.31
United Kingdom 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.22
Canada 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.17
Anywhere 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.31 0.11 0.31
Visa price 829 785.10 485 625.33
Canoe price 419 089.91 43 049.96
Embassy price 3 071 603 935 445.5
Migration prices 2 220 254 1 756 592
Male 0.88 0.33 0.88 0.32 0.88 0.33
Age 26.95 08.01 24.45 5.36 25.96 7.18
Married 0.32 0.47 0.17 0.37 0.26 0.44
Child is male 0.88 0.33 0.78 0.42 0.84 0.37
Child is female 0.89 0.31 0.78 0.42 0.85 0.36
Adult is male 0.79 0.41 0.70 0.46 0.75 0.43
Adult is female 0.84 0.37 0.84 0.37 0.84 0.37
79
Table 2.1: Summary statistics (continued)
Variables Legal migration Illegal migration Total
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Education level
Low education level 0.33 0.47 0.55 0.50 0.42 0.49
Secondary level 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44
University level 0.24 0.43 0.05 0.22 0.16 0.37
Koranic school 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36
Home owner 0.57 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.56 0.50
Mouride 0.39 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.45 0.50
Ethnic dummies
Wolof 0.36 0.48 0.30 0.46 0.34 0.47
Lebou 0.16 0.37 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39
Hal Pular 0.14 0.34 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.32
Serere 0.22 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42
Diola 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23
Manjack 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.10
Bambara, Mandingue, Sub-region 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.26
Region dummies
Campus 0.17 0.38 0.02 0.14 0.11 0.32
Fass, Medina and Geule tapée 0.11 0.32 0.10 0.31 0.11 0.31
Guédiawaye 0.34 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.36 0.48
Sandaga 0.10 0.30 0.16 0.37 0.12 0.33
Kayar, Thiaroye, Yarakh and Yo¤ 0.27 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.30 0.46
Observations 222 145 367
Note: Amounts are presented in Fcfa and 1 Euro=656.56 Fcfa.
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Table 2.2. Average migration prices according to the destination countries
Visa method 1 Visa method 2 Canoe method Embassy method
Spain 1 100 000 450 552 391 981 2 153 846
US 910 000 828 567 430 000 4 041 667
Italy 250 000 537 875 390 476 2 346 154
France 237 500 495 855 unknown 2 952 381
United Kingdom unknown 543 390 unknown 3 700 000
Canada 200 000 873 377 600 000 1 850 000
Other 1 750 000 462 500 4 585 715
Notes: Prices are presented in Fcfa. 1 Euro=655.957 Fcfa. Visa method 1 means that the legal
migration prices are given by respondents. Visa method 2 represents the real prices of legal
migration. For the canoe method for the U.S., we only see one press report that reported a case of
boat-people trying to reach this country. And for the case of Canada, we just have two respondents
that gave us the prices for this destination and this kind of migration. Consequently, it was di¢cult
to check the "canoe method" prices for this destination because we had fewer respondents and the
use of boats or roads to Canada is perhaps not impossible but unlikely. The Visa method 1 price
is unknown for the United Kingdom and the Canoe method price is unknown both for France and
the United Kingdom. The reason is that we did not nd any respondent that was able to give us
these prices. For all the other prices we were able to check their reliability.
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Table 2.3. Individual characteristics and willingness to migrate illegally
Probit Model
Marginal e¤ects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log wage per capita 0.002 0.010
(0.05) (0.26)
Education level
Secondary level -0.129** -0.124*
(2.09) (1.91)
University level -0.281*** -0.332***
(3.77) (4.94)
Koranic school -0.120 -0.106
(1.62) (1.37)
Male 0.083 0.108 0.121 0.137
(0.98) (1.26) (1.47) (1.63)
Age -0.012** -0.013** -0.011** -0.012**
(2.27) (2.41) (2.05) (2.11)
Married -0.252*** -0.246*** -0.259*** -0.257***
(4.05) (3.75) (4.20) (3.95)
Child is male -0.083 -0.106 -0.091 -0.116
(0.95) (1.15) (1.06) (1.29)
Child is female -0.132 -0.137 -0.110 -0.117
(1.41) (1.40) (1.16) (1.17)
Adult is male -0.084 -0.065 -0.079 -0.058
(1.16) (0.89) (1.06) (0.78)
Adult is female 0.100 0.103 0.107 0.112
(1.28) (1.25) (1.38) (1.39)
Home owner -0.108* -0.088 -0.098* -0.075
(1.90) (1.50) (1.66) (1.24)
Mouride 0.136** 0.136** 0.125** 0.125**
(2.33) (2.22) (2.11) (2.02)
Observations 367 343 367 343
Notes: The reference category of the variable education level is low education level. Ethnic and
Region dummies are included in all estimates. Robust z-statistics in parenthesis:* signicant at
10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 2.4. Migration costs and willingness to migrate illegally
Probit model
Marginal e¤ects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log visa price 0.045 0.035
(1.07) (0.64)
Log canoe price -1.011** -0.602
(2.45) (1.54)
Log embassy price -0.319*** -0.262**
(3.15) (2.03)
Log migration prices -0.325***
Socio-demographic variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 327 290 243 290 343
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parenthesis:* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant
at 1%. Tables showing results with Socio-demographic variables, Ethnic and Region dummies are
available upon request.
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Table 2.5. Expectations, relatives, migration policies and willingness to migrate illegally
Probit Model
Marginal e¤ects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log expected foreign wage 0.065** 0.065*
(1.97) (1.89)
Relatives 0.140* 0.145*
(1.79) (1.79)
Tightening of immigration policies 0.207*** 0.202***
(3.31) (3.16)
Log migration prices -0.342*** -0.318*** -0.336*** -0.347***
(8.77) (8.89) (9.10) (8.87)
Socio-demographic variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 339 343 343 339
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parenthesis:* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant
at 1%. Tables showing results with Socio-demographic variables, Ethnic and Region dummies are
available upon request.
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Table 2.6. Destinations and willingness to migrate illegally
Probit model
Marginal e¤ects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Spain 0.210***
(3.10)
Italy 0.180**
(2.32)
US -0.149**
(2.36)
France -0.280***
(3.99)
United Kingdom -0.267***
(3.20)
Canada 0.008
(0.19)
Other 0.047
Socio-demographic variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnic dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 343 343 343 343 343 343 343
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parenthesis:* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant
at 1%. Tables showing results with Socio-demographic variables, Ethnic and Region dummies are
available upon request.
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Figure 2.1. Probabilities of death reported by individuals willing to risk
their life
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Figure 2.2. Income expectations and perceptions of potential illegal migrants
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Figure 2.3. Income expectations and perceptions of potential legal migrants
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Figure 2.4. Income expectations and perceptions of potential migrants
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Appendix
A.1 Questionnaire of the Survey made in Senegal
Area. . . . . . . . . . . . .
(1) Gender of the interviewee: (1) Male (2) Female
(2) Age of the interviewee . . .
(3) Marital status
(1) Single (2) Married (3) Widowed (4) Divorced (5) Other (specify). . . . . . . . . .
(4) Ethnic group
(1) Wolof (2) Lébou (3) Hal Pular (4) Sérère (5) Diola (6) Manjaks (7) Other
(specify) . . .
(5) Religious brotherhood
(1) Mouride (2) Tidjiane (3) Layenne (4) Niassène (5) Catholic (6) Protestant
(7) Other (specify) . . .
(6) Education level
(1) None (2) Primary (3) Secondary (4) University or Professional education
(5) Koranic school (6) Literacy in a national language (7) Other (specify)...
(7) Do you have an activity? (1) Yes (2) No
7.1 If yes, which one?
(1) Craftsman (2) Fishman (3) Labourer (4) Hawker (5) Trader (6) Employee
(7) Student (8) Retail trade (9) Other (specify) . . .
(8) Do you have any dependents? (1) Yes (2) No
8.1 If yes, please help us to ll this table:
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Men Women Total
Children (<15 years old)
Adults (>15 years old)
Total
(9) How much do you earn each month?....................
(10) What is your home occupation status?
(1) Room (2) Apartment (3) Familial house (4) Rough House or slum (6)
Other (specify) . . . . . . . . . .
(11) Home occupation status of you and your family?
(1) Home owner (2) Tenant (3) Other (specify) . . .
11.1 If you are tenant, what is the monthly amount of rent (in FCFA) ?......
(12) How much did you spend in the last week?
Food ...
Health ...
Education ...
Transport ...
Other ...
Total ...
(13) Are you willing to migrate? (1) Yes (2) No
If no, acknowledge and stop the survey
13.1 If yes, why? (many possible answers)
(1) Poverty (2) Unemployment (3) Living conditions (4) Feeling of unfairness
(5) To be useful to my family (6) To do the same thing as others (7) Other
(specify). . .
(14) If this reason disappeared, would you still like to migrate?
(1) Yes (2) No
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(15) If you are not able to migrate legally, are you willing to migrate illegally?
(1) Yes (2) No
(16) Will you forego the idea of migrating if immigration policies to enter the host
countries were tightened?
(1) Yes (2) No
(17) Have you ever tried to migrate? (1) Yes (2) No
If no, go to question 20
17.1 If yes, how many attempts have you ever made? . . .
17.2 How much have you ever spent for these attempts? . . .
(18) Where do you nd the resources to migrate? (Many possible answers)
(1) Temporary job (2) Savings (3) Gifts (4) Borrowing from relatives
(5) Other (specify). . . ..
(19) Why dont you try to invest or start a professional activity with the amount
collected? (Many possible answers)
(1) Lack of qualication (2) No help or support (3) Too much corruption (4)
Anyway, it will not work (5) Other (specify). . . ..
(20) To which country would you like to migrate?
(1) Spain (2) United States (3) Italy (4) France (5) United Kingdom (6)
Canada (7) Other (specify). . .
20.1 Why? (Many possible answers)
(1) More exible migration policies (2) Earn money (3) Huge Senegalese di-
aspora (4) Family (5) Friends (6) Extended Relatives
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(7) Easier integration (language, culture. . . ) (8) Easier access to jobs (9)
Access to education and health care
(10) Discovering anything else (11) Other (specify)...
20.2 What is the price for this destination (specify the type of prices)? . . .
(21) How much are you expecting to earn each month in the destination country?. . .
If you are not willing to migrate illegally, go to question 27
(22) How much would you be willing to pay to a smuggler if you were 100% sure of a
successful migration?...
(23) If you had 75% of probability of success, would you be willing to migrate? (1)
Yes (2) No
23.1 If yes, how much are you willing to pay to a smuggler? . . . . . . .
(24) If you have 50% of probability of success, are you willing to migrate? (1) Yes (2)
No
24.1 If yes, how much are you willing to pay to a smuggler? . . . . .
(25) If you had 25% of probability of success, would you be willing to migrate? (1)
Yes (2) No
25.1 If yes, how much are you willing to pay to a smuggler? . . .
(26) If you had 5% of probability of success, would you be willing to migrate? (1)
Yes (2) No
26.1 If yes, how much are you willing to pay to a smuggler? . . . . . . . . .
(27) How much would you accept to give up on migration and stay in Senegal?...
(28) Are you willing to risk your life by migrating? (1) Yes (2) No
28.1 If yes, what are your chances of dying? . . . . . . .
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(29) Do you have family or friends relatives who tried and succeeded to migrate? (1)
Yes (2) No
29.1 If yes, how much do you think that they earn in the destination country?
. . .
29.2 If no, having some family or friends relatives that do not succeed in
migrating, was it discouraging for you? (1) Yes (2) No
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A.2 Denition of variables
Variables Denition
Expected foreign wage
per capita
Expected wage in the destination country reported by potential migrant
divided by 1+ the number of dependents
Wage Measured by the total of monthly expenditures per capita (total of
monthly expenditures divided by 1+ the number of dependents) con-
sidered as the proxy of the potential migrants wage
Tightening of immigra-
tion policies
Dummy equal to 1 if the potential migrant does not give up on migration
if the immigration policies in the host countries were tight.
Relatives Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual has members of his
family, close friends or relatives who have migrated
Destinations (Dummies variables) The destination country where potential migrant
wants to go
Spain Dummy equal to 1 if the individual wants to go to Spain
Italy Dummy equal to 1 if the individual wants to go to Italy
France Dummy equal to 1 if the individual wants to go to France
US Dummy equal to 1 if the individual wants to go to United States
United Kingdom Dummy equal to 1 if the individual wants to go to United Kingdom
Canada Dummy equal to 1 if the individual wants to go to Canada
Other Dummy equal to 1 if the individual wants to go to anywhere: The poten-
tial migrant wants to go to Portugal or Switzerland or in the majority
of cases, anywhere i.e the destination has no importance, he just wants
to migrate
Visa price Average price for each destination for the Visa Method (legal migration
method)
Canoe price Average price for each destination for the Canoe Method (illegal migra-
tion method)
Embassy price Average price for each destination for Embassy Method (illegal migration
method)
Migration prices Prices for the di¤erent destinations and the di¤erent methods of migra-
tion without distinction between the methods of migration
Male Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual is male
Age Age declared by the individual
Married A dummy equal to 1 if the individual is married
Child is male Dummy equal to 1 if the individual has a male dependent child
Child is female Dummy equal to 1 if the individual has a female dependent child
Adult is male Dummy equal to 1 if the individual has a male dependent adult
Adult is female Dummy equal to 1 if the individual has a female dependent adult
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Denition of variables (Continued)
Variables Denition
Education level Dummies variables
Low education level The reference group : in addition to those who have a primary level, it
also includes people who received literacy lectures and those who received
no education
Secondary level The individual has a secondary level
University level The individual has a university level or a professional education
Koranic school The individual went to Koranic school
Home owner Dummy equal to 1 if the individual lives in his own house or in a house
belonging to his family
Mouride Religious dummy equal to 1 if the individual belongs to the Mourides
brotherhood. The others brotherhoods are Tidiane, Layenne, Niassène,
(which are all Muslims), Catholic, Protestant, Muslim who does not
belong to any particular group, animist or without religion.
Ethnic dummies For each ethnic group represented: Wolof, Lebou, Hal Pular, Serere,
Diola, Manjack, Other (Bambara, Mandingue or Come from the sub-
region (Guinea, Mauritania, Ivory Coast)
Region dummies For each area of Dakar represented: University Campus and its sur-
roundings; Fass, Medina and Gueule-Tapée; Guédiawaye; Sandaga; Ka-
yar, Thiaroye, Yarakh and Yo¤.
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Chapter 3
Braving the waves: the role of time
and risk preferences in illegal
migration from Senegal
3.1. Introduction
Illegal migration from less developed countries to rich countries is a very controversial
topic and this issue will become more and more important as the 21st century progresses.
Images of "fortress Europe" with hordes of impoverished people coming from Africa and
knocking at the gates are the basis upon which many right-wing European politicians
base their legitimacy. Despite the scope of illegal migration between Africa and Europe,
0This chapter is joint work with Jean-Louis Arcand (Graduate Institute of Geneva)
0Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the third AFD-World Bank International Migration
and Development Conference and the CSAE Conference, Oxford, United Kingdom. We are grateful to
Luc Behaghel, Jenny Aker, conference participants and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
We also thank Adama Bah, Gaoussou Diarra, Eric Djimeu, Alassane Drabo and Fousseini Traoré for
useful discussions. The usual disclaimer applies.
102
the determinants of this phenomenon have not been studied to any great extent. The
major part of the literature is related to illegal migration between Mexico and the U.S..
These studies show that illegal migrants ows are determined by economic conditions and
more specically by large wage di¤erentials between these two countries (Hanson, 2006;
Orrenius and Zavodny, 2005; Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999), the presence of migrant
networks (Massey and Espinoza, 1997; Singer and Massey, 1998; Doln and Genicot,
2010) or strict deportation policies (Friebel and Guriev, 2006).
The aim of this chapter is to go beyond traditional determinants of migration such as
expectations or networks and study how risk and time preferences inuence illegal migra-
tion intentions and the willingness to pay (WTP) a smuggler in an African context. In
order to examine the role of preferences on illegal migration intentions, we conducted a
tailor-made survey between November 2006 and April 2007 on 400 individuals in Dakar.
We chose Senegal for this study because this country has been severely a¤ected by illegal
migration. As far as we know, no survey comparable has been realized making our study
unique. During the survey we collected information about the socio-demographic charac-
teristics of people, their intentions and attitudes about illegal migration and their WTP
a smuggler in order to attempt illegal migration.
Since we are interested in the role of preferences in illegal migration intentions and
more specically in the WTP a smuggler with a probability one of success, we draw on
literature of the determinants of the WTP and of the role of risk and time preferences
on the agents decision-making and on the willingness to pay. The WTP concept is
generally used in contingent valuation methods in order to evaluate the monetary value
of a non-market good. These concepts have been largely studied in many areas such
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as environment (see for instance Hanemann, 1994; Whittington et al., 1990; Verbic and
Slabe-Erker, 2009), health economics (see for instance Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2009;
Protière et al., 2004; Nguessan, 2008; Dror et al., 2007) or infrastructures (Torero et al.,
2003). The determinants of the willingness to pay have also been studied in the eld
of migration. For instance, Sengupta and Hedge (2005) study the determinants of the
willingness to pay among undocumented agricultural workers from Mexico for getting
legal visas in rural Southern California. According to these authors, the willingness to
pay of undocumented workers measures the perceived benet of having a legal status and
the implicit cost of being undocumented. They nd that this WTP is determined by the
perception that the legal status is both associated with a higher wage and a reduction
of the unemployment period at the beginning of the migration to the U.S.. In the case
of the role of individual preferences on the WTP a smuggler, it is interesting to look at
how risk and time preferences a¤ect agents decision-making in general and migration
intentions in particular. From the 1995 Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and
Wealth (SHIM), Paiella and Guiso(2004) use the WTP for a hypothetical risky asset
to measure the degree of risk aversion of households. They nd that risk aversion plays
an important role in household decisions related to their choice of occupation, portfolio
selection, investment in education, job moving decisions and exposure to chronic diseases.
In the case of migration, Daveri and Faini (1999) use aggregate panel data from Southern
Italy and nd that risk-aversion is a strong determinant of internal and international
migration. Heitmueller (2005) argues that being risk-averse decreases the likelihood to
migrate relative to being risk neutral. Moreover, risk-averse people are more likely to
go to countries with high unemployment benets because they decrease the volatility
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of expected payo¤s of migration whereas risk-loving people will choose countries with a
high degree of income volatility that increases their utility. These results are conrmed
by Nowotny (2010) who nds that being risk averse decreases the willingness to migrate
and to commute whereas a higher discount rate is associated with a higher intention to
migrate.
In the case of our study, we interpret the willingness to pay a smuggler with a proba-
bility one of success as the perception of the payo¤ of a successful illegal migration. The
payo¤ here is dened as safe arrival in the destination country without being apprehended.
During the survey we ask to people direct questions to elicit information about their will-
ingness to pay a smuggler, their degree of aversion to risk and their subjective rate of
time preference. Our approach is similar to Barsky et al., (1997). From an experimental
approach with participants in the Health and Retirement Study, these authors ask direct
questions that involve choice in hypothetical situations. Their measure of risk aversion is
obtained with answers about the willingness of people to gamble on life-time income and
their measure of intertemporal substitution, and time preferences are obtained by asking
people to choose consumption proles implicitly associated with di¤erent rates of return.
In this study, we rst use a theoretical model to study how preferences a¤ect the illegal
migration intention and the willingness to pay a smuggler with a probability one of suc-
cess. Then, we dene theoretically two expressions of time and risk preferences through
the individual intertemporal discount rate and the individuals coe¢cient of absolute risk
aversion. We later compute for each individual a mean value of the discount rate and of
the coe¢cient of absolute risk-aversion with an associated standard deviation. Finally,
we use a Heckman procedure to empirically test our theoretical predictions because the
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willingness to pay a smuggler with a probability one of success is only observed for the
sample of potential illegal migrants. However, we have to specify that the individual
preferences variables are also only available for the potential illegal migrants. Therefore,
we are not able to test the theoretical predictions of the e¤ect of these variables on the
illegal migration intention but only on the willingness to pay a smuggler.
Our results can be summarized as follows: rst, the likelihood that an individual
chooses illegal over legal migration is an increasing function of the intertemporal discount
rate, an ambiguous function of risk-aversion, an increasing function of the expected for-
eign wage and a decreasing function of the price of illegal migration. Second, the price
that an individual is willing to pay a smuggler for an illegal migration attempt with a
probability one of success is an increasing function of the intertemporal discount rate, a
decreasing function of risk-aversion, an increasing function of the expected foreign wage,
an ambiguous function of the domestic wage and a increasing function of the lump sum
payment necessary to induce an individual not to leave Senegal. This chapter shows that
in addition to determinants of migration such as the expected foreign wage, networks,
immigration policies or migration prices, individual preferences matter in the formation
of an illegal migration project and can explain the risky behavior of candidates regarding
illegal migration.
The remaining part of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section presents
a model of the illegal migration intention and the willingness to pay a smuggler with a
probability one of success. In Section 3.3 we evaluate theoretically the expressions of the
individuals intertemporal discount rate and the individuals coe¢cient of absolute risk
aversion that we calculate in order to make our estimations. Section 3.4 presents the data
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and the descriptive statistics obtained from our survey. The estimation strategy and the
empirical results are discussed in Section 3.5. Finally the concluding remarks are provided
in Section 3.6.
3.2. Migration intention and willingness to pay
3.2.1. The migration intention
Let the monthly wage in Senegal be denoted by w, and the expected wage in the destina-
tion country be denoted by w. We consider that the timing of migration takes place at
time zero. At this moment, we assume that for both potential legal and illegal migrants,
the nal decision of migration is taken. At time zero, potential legal migrants have the
level of skills requiered and their decison to migrate is denitive. Their migration attempt
is not a "wait and see" option. For illegal migrants the credit constraint is released at time
zero and they get the the necessary funds to nance their migration. The one-shot price
of reaching the destination will be denoted by C with associated probability of success p.
Illegal migrants do not immediately make another attempt if they are apprehended and
sent back to home. It is very likely to assume that if they want to make another attempt,
they need to nd new nancial resources that can take a lot of time and make another
attempt unrealizable at time 0.
Consider a simple present discounted value (PDV) calculation, in which t represents
the current age of the individual, T his retirement age, and  his discount rate. Preferences
are assumed to be represented by a utility function denoted by u(:). There is no role for
return migration. Then the intertemporal welfare associated with an unsuccessful attempt
at leaving Senegal at time 0, and therefore remaining there from time 0 until retirement
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at age T , while earning a constant monthly wage w is given by:
(3.1) V UE = u (w   C) + u (w)
=T tX
=1
1
(1 + )
= u (w   C) + u (w)
1  (1 + )t T

;
(where the superscript UE stands for unsuccessful emigration). Conversely, we assume
that the attempt at emigrating is successful, costs C and results in earning the foreign
wage w starting at  = 1. This yields an intertemporal welfare given by:
(3.2) V SE = u (w   C) + u (w)
1  (1 + )t T

;
(where the superscript SE stands for successful emigration). In what follows, we will refer
to 1 (1+)
t T

as the individuals "intertemporal discount rate". The expected value of the
attempt at emigration is therefore given by E [V ] = pV SE + (1  p)V UE. Substituting
from (3.1) and (3.2) yields:
(3.3) E [V ] = u (w   C) + [pu (w) + (1  p) u (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

:
Let the intertemporal welfare associated with remaining in Senegal and earning a wage w
from t = 0 to t = T be given by:
(3.4) V = u (w)
(1 + )  (1 + )t T

An individual will attempt to emigrate when E [V ] > V , which can be written, by sub-
stituting from (3.3) and (3.4) and simplifying the ensuing expression, as:
(3.5) u (w   C)  u (w) + p [u (w)  u (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

> 0:
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The preceding model is, of course, extremely reminiscent of the standard approaches
due to Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970).
What is the di¤erence between legal and illegal migration in terms of the theoretical
model? During the survey, we ask the questions: (1) are you willing to migrate? (2) If you
are not able to migrate legally, are you willing to migrate illegally? We put the question
this way because we consider that if people have a high probability to succeed a legal
migration, they will attempt it. However, the perceptions of most people would be that
the likelihood of success of legal migration out of Senegal is signicantly lower than the
probability of success through illegal migration. Individuals will attempt illegal migration
if they do not have any other legal possibility or if they assume that they have no chance of
success in a legal migration due to their level of education and/or their social condition. A
second characteristic of legal migration is that the associated administrative costs are very
low (usually amounting to the cost of the visa application and the documents that must
be submitted along with it), though the airfare to the potential destination country does
increase the overall price, particularly when compared with the prices of illegal migration
methods.
If we allow the expression given in (3.3) to represent the case of illegal migration, and
carry out a similar PDV calculation for legal migration,where the probability of success
is denoted by q < p and the price is denoted by K, we obtain:
E

V illegal

= u (w   C) + [pu (w) + (1  p) u (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

;
E

V legal

= u (w  K) + [qu (w) + (1  q) u (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

:
109
The individual will then prefer illegal over legal migration when E

V illegal

> E

V legal

,
which can be written explicitly as:
(3.6) u (w   C)  u (w  K) + (p  q) (u (w)  u (w))
1  (1 + )t T

> 0:
Consider the two following second-order Taylor expansions:
u (w   C)  u(w)  Cu0(w) +
C2
2
u00(w);
u (w  K)  u(w) Ku0(w) +
K2
2
u00(w):
Then one can rewrite (3.6) as:
(3.7)
(K   C) u0(w)

1 +
1
2
(C +K)

 
u00(w)
u0(w)

| {z }
u(w C) u(w K)
+(p  q) (u (w)  u (w))
1  (1 + )t T

> 0:
One can then immediately establish the following Proposition by straightforward di¤er-
entiation of (3.7):
Proposition 1. The likelihood that an individual chooses illegal over legal emigration is:
(i) an increasing function of the intertemporal discount rate 1 (1+)
t T

, (ii) an increasing
function of the expected foreign wage, (iii) a decreasing function of the price of illegal
migration, (iv) an increasing (decreasing) function of risk-aversion when K   C > (<) 0
Proposition 1 establishes clear comparative statics results for all variables of interest,
with the exception of risk-aversion, for which the comparative statics are ambiguous.
110
3.2.2. The Willingness to pay a smuggler
We consider the willingness to pay a smuggler with a probability of success equal to 1,
which we denote by C. This willingness to pay is implicitly dened by the solution in
C to the following equation:
u (w   C)  u (w) + [u (w)  u (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

= 0:
By the same second-order Taylor expansion as above, this can be rewritten as:
[u (w)  u (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

 

u0(w)C  
C2
2
u00(w)

= 0;
or
(3.8) [u (w)  u (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

  u0(w)

C +
C2
2

 
u00(w)
u0(w)

= 0:
By the Implicit Function Theorem, one can then immediately establish the following
Proposition:
Proposition 2. The price that an individual is willing to pay a smuggler for an illegal
immigration attempt with probability 1 of success is: (i) an increasing function of the
intertemporal discount rate 1 (1+)
t T

, (ii) an increasing function of the expected foreign
wage, (iii) an ambiguous function of the domestic wage, (iv) a decreasing function of
risk-aversion.
Proof. See the Appendix for details. 
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The only ambiguity in the willingness to pay a smuggler for an illegal immigration
attempt with probability 1 of success is associated with the e¤ect of the domestic wage.
All other comparative statics results for our model including the e¤ect of risk-aversion
are clear-cut.
3.3. Infering preferences
Let the lump sum payment necessary to induce an individual not to leave Senegal
be denoted by D. Indi¤erence between remaining in Senegal and receiving the lump
sum payment D at  = 0 (with associated intertemporal welfare V LS = u (w +D) +
u (w) 1 (1+)
t T

, where the superscript LS stands for lump sum), and the expected value
of an attempt at emigration with cost Cj and probability of success pj (with associated
intertemporal welfare E [V ]) therefore yields 0 = E [V ]   V LS, which can be expressed
more explicitly as:
(3.9) 0 = u (w   Cj) + [pju (w
)  pju (w)]
1  (1 + )t T

  u (w +D) :
The reason for indexing the pair (Cj; pj) by j will become apparent in what follows. If
retirement age is considered indenitely far away by individuals (T !1) and individuals
are risk neutral (u (w) = w) then (3.9) simplies to D = pj(w

 w)

  Cj. Given the
appropriate data, which include various values of the cost Cj individuals are willing to
bear in order to achieve migration success with a given known probability pj, equation
(3.9) allows one to recover both the discount rate  and risk aversion in the context of
the emigration decision. We show this in the following Proposition.
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Proposition 3. If the individual is willing to emigrate at cost Cj (Ck) with associated
probability of success pj (pk), and is willing to forego emigration in return for a lump-sum
payment D, then:
(i) the individuals coe¢cient of absolute risk-aversion is given by
A(w) = 2
pj (Ck +D)  pk (Cj +D)
pj (D2   C2k)  pk
 
D2   C2j
 ;
(ii) the individuals discount rate is dened by
1  (1 + )t T

=
(Cj +D) (Ck +D) (Ck   Cj)
w [pj (Ck +D) (Ck +w  D)  pk (Cj +D) (Cj +w  D)]
:
Proof. The proof follows from a second-order Taylor expansion of (3.9), and noticing
that the ensuing expression holds for any two gambles (Cj; pj) and (Ck; pk). See the
Appendix for details. 
For each individual, we have ve gambles (Cj; pj). There are therefore 4+3+2+1 =
10 possible versions of the two expressions given in Proposition 3. For each individual, we
can therefore compute a mean value of A(w) and 1 (1+)
t T

, with an associated standard
deviation.
3.4. Data and estimates of preferences
3.4.1. The Survey
In order to examine the intentions and possible triggering factors of illegal migration we
conducted a tailor-made survey in Senegal. This study was conducted in Dakar and is
exploratory. It does not allow us to generalize our results to all the Senegalese population.
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However, since illegal migration from Africa has not been greatly studied, the original data
set obtained from this survey can help to ll the gap in the literature and give us the
opportunity to understand this phenomenon further.
A random sample of individuals was interviewed between November 2006 and April
2007. Prior to the main survey, a pilot study was conducted in order to be able to adjust
for possible biases. There are four sections of the survey: rstly, we elicit a wealth of
information about the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the individuals.
Secondly, we elicit the willingness or intentions of individuals to migrate legally or illegally
and the motivations behind it. Thirdly, the individuals are asked a detailed battery of
questions about the preferred destinations. Fourthly, we are interested in the willingness
of the individuals to risk their lives or to take nancial risks, for example, by paying a
smuggler.
The sampling design was made considering various diversities in Dakar simultaneously.
400 randomly chosen individuals in Dakar were interviewed in di¤erent neighborhoods.
The survey was conducted in major ve regions of Dakar. The rst one is the University
Campus and its surroundings. Many people belonging to the middle class live in this
neighborhood. The second neighborhood is Fass, Medina and Geule-Tapee and the third
one is Guediawaye. The second and the third regions are mainly some popular neigh-
borhoods. The fourth level of randomization is Sandaga which is one of the main areas
shopping in the city center. Many people coming from the rural sector work there. For
some of them, Dakar is the nal destination but for many the city is a temporary place
for preparing further migration by working in low-paying jobs. Finally, the fth region
is the main departure beaches for illegal migrants namely Kayar, Thiaroye, Yarakh and
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Yo¤. Since our aim is to explain the illegal migration intentions, the stratication was
made in order to identify people having a high propensity to migrate. Consequently we
did not include rich regions in Dakar because it is very unlikely that people living in these
neighborhoods have to consider migration and illegal migration in particular.1
In our survey, we ask people directly: "Are you willing to migrate?" to measure their
intentions. 92% of our sample, i.e. 367 individuals, answer yes (Table 3.1). We focus our
analysis on individuals willing to attempt legal or illegal migration. To those who wish
to migrate we ask the question: "If you are not able to migrate legally, are you willing
to migrate illegally?"2 Among the 367 individuals who wish to migrate 222 report that
they would only migrate legally and 145 report that they would migrate illegally. The
proportion of people who consider migration is high (92%) and needs to be discussed. We
have some variation across regions where we conducted the survey and the proportion of
people who wish to migrate is high in all these areas. First of all, it does not mean that
all these people will attempt migration. However, some of them will do so. As mentioned
above, we measure the intentions of people and we call them potential migrants. In
fact, this high number is a very strong indication of the degree of frustration about the
economic conditions faces by the average Senegalese individual.
1These people are in most cases highly educated, much wealthier than the average population and
have good living conditions in Senegal. Moreover, when they have to go abroad they are able to provide
reliable documents to consular o¢cials and do not have any issue with traveling legally.
2We ask the question in this form, because we assume that if people have the opportunity to migrate
legally they will naturally go towards this type of migration. In the Senegalese context, it is very likely that
people attempting illegal migration have the perceptions that, because of their low level of qualications,
the instability or the weakness of their professional situation, obtaining legitimate documents would be
di¢cult for them. Attempting legal migration would be a waste of time and therefore, they will restrict
themselves to ask for legal documents.
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3.4.2. Descriptive statistics
[Table 3.1 HERE]
The summary statistics are presented in Table 3.1. 40% of potential migrants are
willing to migrate illegally. This high proportion of people willing to attempt illegal
migration shows their determination to migrate whatever the risks. The average monthly
expected wage of a potential migrant is 1 567 466 Fcfa, i.e. 2 389 Euros. The wage in
Senegal is approximated by the average monthly expenditure of individuals because people
answer more easily about their expenditures that makes more reliable this variable than
the income. The average monthly expenditure is estimated at 76 055 Fcfa, i.e. 115.94
Euros which is very low compared to the expected wage. 68% of potential migrants report
that they will not forgo the idea of migrating if there is a tightening of immigration policies.
This variable means that the conditions to enter the destination countries are made more
restrictive. These conditions can be related to the quotas of immigrants, the education
level or to stricter border controls of the destination countries. 3.74% of potential migrants
have some family or friends relatives who have migrated. The average migration price
is 2 220 254 Fcfa (2335 Euros) which is very high. Men represent 88% of the sample of
potential migrants. This proportion is explained by the fact that people reachable in the
di¤erent neighborhoods were mainly male which is consistent with our aim of reaching
the part of the population with a high intention to migrate. The average age is 26 years
old. Married people represent 26% of the sample and 84% of people have at least one
male dependent child. 42% of potential migrants have a low level of education and this
proportion decreases gradually with secondary and university level of education. 56% of
potential migrants live in a house that belongs to them or their family. Mouride is a
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dummy equal to one if people belong to this religious brotherhood. Senegal is composed
of 94% of Muslim people, 5% of Christian people and 1% of Animist people. A lot of
Muslim people are a¢liated to di¤erent brotherhoods headed by a spiritual guide and
Mouride is one of the most important brotherhoods in Senegal. People belonging to the
Mouride brotherhood represent 45% of potential migrants.
[FIGURE 3.1 HERE]
[FIGURE 3.2 HERE]
The average individuals discount rate is equal to 0.91 for potential illegal migrants.
When we look more specically at the distribution of this variable (Figure 3.1), 64%
of potential migrants have a discount rate above 0 and 28% of them have a discount
rate above 0.8. Figure 3.2 shows the histogram of the mean value of the individuals
coe¢cient of absolute risk aversion A(w). We calculate these values from proposition 3
of the theoretical model. We observe that the individuals coe¢cients of absolute risk
aversion are very close to 0 which means that the individuals are risk neutral. They do
not care about risks they take with illegal migration which is a strong signal of their
determination. In order to have more variability than the mean value of individuals
coe¢cients of absolute risk aversion A(w), we create a dummy equal to one if potential
illegal migrants are risk-averse (the mean value of individuals coe¢cients of absolute risk
aversion is positive) and 0 if they are risk-loving (the mean value of individuals coe¢cients
of absolute risk aversion is negative). It is this dummy variable that we are going to use
in the estimations.
[TABLE 3.2 HERE]
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Results shown in Figure 2 are conrmed in Table 2 where we present the descriptive
statistics of the willingness to pay a smuggler associated with di¤erent probabilities of
success for those who are willing to migrate illegally. We observe that the lower the
probability of success, the lower is the share of individuals who are willing to migrate
illegally. However, this proportion remains high compared to the risk taken. Indeed,
with a probability of success of 5%, 53% of people are still willing to migrate illegally.
Moreover, the di¤erence between their willingness to pay with a probability of success
of one and a probability of success of 0.05 is quite low. It is estimated at only 216 356
Fcfa, i.e. 329 Euros. These amounts are high in the case of Senegal but they are very
realistic. The willingness to pay a smuggler with a probability equal to one corresponds
approximately to the monthly expected wage of potential migrants. Migrants are well
informed about di¤erent prices in the illegal migration market. Thus, it is likely that if
they nance their migration by a loan, for instance, they plan to repay the smuggler with
their rst wage earned in the host country. The average lump sum payment necessary
to induce an individual not to leave Senegal (D) is equal to 1.76e+09 Fcfa (2 680 638
Euros). This amount is an indication of the large utility gap of potential migrants between
migrating or remaining in Senegal.
3.5. Econometric strategy and results
3.5.1. Estimation strategy
The aim of this section is to empirically test our theoretical predictions. However, since the
individual preferences variables are also only available for the potential illegal migrants,
we are not able to test the theoretical predictions of the e¤ect of these variables on the
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illegal migration intention but only on the willingness to pay a smuggler. Individuals will
pay a smuggler only if they are willing to migrate illegally. Therefore, the willingness to
pay is observed only for the part of the sample willing to migrate illegally. In this case,
we do not have a random selection. Then, to avoid a selection bias and a specication
error, we use a Heckman procedure (Heckman, 1979). We estimate the selection equation
by a probit model and the outcome equation by a linear model. Then we have:
(3.10) Outcome equation: yi = xiC + wiD + i + Br + "i
(3.11) Selection equation: mi =

1 if xiC + zi + Br + i > 0
0 if xiC + zi + Br + i  0
Where:
yi is observed only when mi = 1
"i  N(0; )
i  N(0; 1)
corr("i; i) = 
In equation (3.10), yi represents the logarithm of the willingness to pay a smuggler
with a probability one of success. (wi) is the vector of interest variables. (wi) includes the
mean value of the individuals discount rates represented by 1 (1+)
t T

and a dummy equal
to one if the individual is risk-averse. These values are calculated from the proposition 3
in the theoretical model and D is the vector of parameters to be estimated. xi is the vector
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of control variables including variables considered as triggering factors of illegal migration
such as the logarithm of the expected monthly foreign wage per capita, the logarithm of
migration prices, immigration policies measured by a dummy equal to one if individuals
will not give up on migration in case of a tightening of immigration policies, a dummy equal
to one if individuals have family or friends relatives who have migrated. This variable
allows us to take into account the network e¤ects. xi also includes the socio-demographic
characteristics such as the logarithm of the monthly wage in Senegal per capita3, gender,
age, marital status, dummy equal to one if the individual has male dependent child, home
occupation status (dummy equal to one if the individual and his family live in their own
home), a dummy equal to one if the individual belongs to the Mouride brotherhood and
indicator variables for ethnic groups. C is the vector of parameters to be estimated. As
mentioned in the third section, there are mainly ve regions in Dakar where we collected
our data. In order to capture unobserved regional characteristics, we control equation
(3.10) for ve regional dummies (Br).
In the selection equation (equation 3.11), mi is the binary variable equal to one if the
individual reports a possibility for illegal migration and 0 otherwise; xi is the same vector
of control variables included in the outcome equation and zi is the exclusion variable rep-
resented by di¤erent levels of education. We assume that the level of education inuences
the intention to migrate illegally but not the willingness to pay a smuggler with a proba-
bility one of success because expected returns from skills for an illegal migration are very
low. First, this is due to the fact that illegal migrants are generally less skilled than legal
3The monthly wage in Senegal per capita is approximated by the average monthly expenditure of the
individuals divided by the number of dependents. We divided the average monthly expenditures of the
individuals by 1+ the number of dependents and also the foreign expected wage by 1 + the number of
dependents to take into account the burden of responsibilities that may inuence the method of migration.
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migrants. They tend to invest less in human capital due to a higher risk of apprehension
(Chiswick, 1999). However, it is also shown in the literature that with the same charac-
teristics illegal migrants are less paid than legal migrants due to their shorter expected
duration in the destination and the limitations of their the job mobility (Kossoudji and
Cobb-Clark, 2002; Rivera-Batiz, 1999). For instance Rivera-Batiz (1999) shows that even
if illegal migrants are less educated, get worse language prociency and have a shorter
period of residence in the U.S. than legal migrants, the gap between the earnings of illegal
and legal migrants is mainly explained by the illegal status of undocumented workers
who are exploited by their employers. This gap is decreased more by the legalization of
illegal migrants than by the changes in the characteristics of migrants. Moreover, illegal
migrants are used to work in low-paid jobs (Taylor, 1992) where their qualications, if
they exist, are not fully expoited because of their illegal status.
3.5.2. Results
[TABLE 3.3 HERE]
Table 3.3 reports the results of the Heckman procedure. Our results show that the
willingness to migrate illegally is an increasing function of the foreign expected wage
which conrms our theoretical predictions (Column 1). Great expectations can increase
migration intentions (Dalen et al., 2005; De Jong, 2000) and our results show that this
is particularly true in the case of illegal migration. The expected wage value can often
be evaluated on what potential migrants think about the salaries of their relatives who
have already migrated. Relatives can give information (biased or not) about their liv-
ing conditions in the host country that can spark o¤ the desire to migrate illegally for
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those remaining in the origin country. This is conrmed by the results of the variable
relatives. We nd that having family and friends relatives who have already migrated
increases signicantly the likelihood to migrate illegally. We use the variable relatives as
a proxy of the network e¤ects that are integrated in migration plans because they help to
reduce migration costs (Munshi, 2003; Carrington et al., 1996). Networks are a source of
information on the locations and a¤ect the destination choice of migrants (Epstein and
Gang, 2006). In the specic case of illegal migration, networks give some information and
some assistance about the nancing of the illegal migration or the procedure to follow
to migrate illegally (Doln and Genicot, 2010). Another triggering factor that we con-
sider in our estimations is the variable tightening of immigration policies. This variable is
positive and signicantly di¤erent from 0 at a level of 1%. It means that people will not
forgo illegal migration in the case of tight immigration policies to enter the host countries.
Therefore, contrary to the initial objectives, these policies may have pernicious e¤ects by
discouraging legal migration and by involving increased ow of illegal migrants. These
results are a reminder of those of Orrenius (2004) and Gathman (2008) that show that
restrictive immigration policies measured by an enforcement of the border controls be-
tween Mexico and the U.S. have a small deterrent e¤ect on illegal migration ows. There
is a negative relationship between migration prices and the likelihood to migrate illegally.
The main reason is that illegal migration is an expensive project which requires large
funds that the poorest cannot a¤ord. These amounts often involve taking loans to nance
migration or years of savings. The result of the level of education that represents our
exclusion variable show that having a university level of education strongly reduces the
likelihood to migrate illegally compared to having a low level of education. This variable
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is positive and signicant at a level of 1%. This result can be explained by the fact that
educated and skilled people have better living conditions and have also a higher likelihood
of obtaining legitimate documents for legal migration.
The results of the outcome equation are reported in Column 2 of Table 3.3. The results
show that our theoretical propositions are conrmed by our estimations. We nd that the
average individuals discount rate is signicantly and positively related to the willingness
to pay a smuggler with a probability one of success. If the individuals preference for the
present is higher, the potential illegal migrant has a higher willingness to pay a smuggler
with a probability one of success. A legal procedure can take a lot of time and many
attempts without any guarantee of success. Consequently, individuals who are willing to
be engaged in illegal migration are also willing to pay a smuggler more to immediately
improve their living conditions. The risk aversion dummy is signicant and decreases the
willingness to pay a smuggler. The willingness to pay a smuggler with a probability one
of success will be 65% lower for risk-averse than for risk-loving people. The explanation
being that paying a smuggler induces de facto a nancial risk associated with the nature of
the project that only the most determined can take. Moreover, the behavior of these less
risk averse individuals can be a sort of signal for the smugglers to determine the most risky
"clients" and raise their prices for this category of people.4 The higher the expectations,
the higher will be the amount that people are willing to pay to guarantee them a successful
migration. For an increase of 10% in the foreign expected wage per capita, the willingness
4According to Pratt (1964) the risk premium is a positive monotonic function of the risk aversion.
However in some cases, the WTP may negatively be related to the degree of risk aversion. A risk-neutral
individual can have a higher willingness to pay than a risk-averse individual for a partial reduction of
risk (Eeckhoudt et al., 1997; Langlais, 2005)
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to pay a smuggler with a probability one of success will be increased by 1.78%. However,
the wage earned in Senegal does not appear signicant which conrms the ambiguous
function of this variable in our theoretical predictions. The migration prices become
insignicant at the second step which shows that potential migrants once they are willing
to migrate illegally are strongly motivated and the migration prices no longer constitute
a constraint in their willingness to pay a smuggler. Potential illegal migrants who do not
forgo migration in the case of a tightening of immigration will decrease their willingness
to pay a smuggler in order to have more chances to achieve the project. This result is
signicant at a level of 5%. The Inverse Mills Ratio is not signicant, which means that
there is no selection bias.5
Columns 3 and 4 present the results of the estimations with the lump sum payment
necessary to induce an individual not to leave Senegal as variable of interest. The lump
sum payment is also a measure of the individual preferences because it captures the
monetary value given to migration and gives an indication of the utility gap between
migrating or remaining in Senegal. The lump sum payment is not signicant at the rst
step which means that is does not a¤ect the likelihood to migrate illegally instead of
legally. However, for potential illegal migrants, there is a positive relationship between
the lump sum payment and the willingness to pay a smuggler. An increase of 10% in
the lump sum payment increases by 1.45% the willingness to pay a smuggler with a
probability one of success. This result means that the more potential illegal migrants give
5The observations are 332 instead of 367 because of missing values due rst to the wage in Senegal,
even if we take the monthly expenditure as proxy of this variable that already allows us to decrease the
number of missing values. Second, it is due to indetermined discount rates and coe¢cients of absolute
risk aversion for some individuals who decide to not migrate from a certain probability of success lower
than one. For these people we cannot form all the gambles (Cj ; pj) necessary to calculate the variables
of preferences.
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a high value to migration, the more they are willing to pay a smuggler in order to succeed
in their illegal migration project. Then, the higher the lump sum payment necessary to
induce an individual not to leave Senegal, the higher is the utility gap between migrating
or remaining in Senegal.
3.6. Concluding remarks and implications
The aim of this chapter is to show the role of time and risk preferences in the illegal
migration intentions and the willingness to pay a smuggler. From a theoretical model, we
study how these variables a¤ect illegal migration intention and the willingness to pay a
smuggler with a probability one of success. We also dene theoretically two expressions
of time and risk preferences that we use later in our estimations. One of the novelties
of the chapter is to use an original data set from a tailor-made survey among potential
migrants in Senegal to test our theoretical predictions.
Our comparative statistics show that rst, the likelihood to migrate illegally is an
increasing function of the intertemporal discount rate, an ambiguous function of the risk
aversion, an increasing function of the expected foreign wage and a decreasing function
of the price of illegal migration. Second, the price that an individual is willing to pay a
smuggler for an illegal immigration attempt with probability one of success is an increasing
function of the intertemporal discount rate, a decreasing function of risk-aversion, an
increasing function of the expected foreign wage, an ambiguous function of the domestic
wage. We could empirically test all our theoretical predictions except the e¤ect of the
the intertemporal discount rate and the risk aversion on the illegal migration intention
due to the non availability of the data for potential legal migrants. All other theoretical
125
predictions are conrmed by the empirical estimations. The empirical results also show
that the willingness to pay a smuggler is an increasing function of the lump sum payment
necessary to induce an individual not to leave Senegal. We nd that in addition to the
determinants of migration such as the expectations, presence of relatives in the destination
country, immigration policies or migration prices, individual preferences measured by the
intertemporal discount rate and the risk aversion matter in the illegal migration intention.
Moreover the positive relationship between the lump sum payment necessary to induce an
individual not to leave Senegal and the willingness to pay a smuggler means that potential
illegal migrants give a high monetary value to illegal migration and have a high utility
gap between migrating and remaining in Senegal.
Individual preferences have then to be considered in the explanation of illegal migration
and also in the probable non e¢ciency of immigration policies that do not take into
account the determination and the "emergency" that potential illegal migrants have to
improve their living conditions.
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics
Variables Mean SD Obs
Migrate illegally 0.40 0.49 367
Willingness to pay 1 480 556 2 004 192 144.
Average discount rate 0.91 3.32 138
Risk aversion 0.92 0.27 138
Lump sum payment 1.76e+09 2.34e+10 294
Expected foreign wage 1 567 466 5 486 186 363
Expected foreign wage per capita 893 918 5 332 343 363
wage 76 054.93 64 698.93 343
Wage per capita 21 481.92 16 979.35 343
Tightening of immigration policies 0.68 0.47 367
Relatives 0.74 0.44 367
Migration prices 2 220 254 1 756 592 367
Male 0.88 0.33 367
Age 25.96 07.18 367
Married 0.26 0.44 367
Child is male 0.84 0.37 367
Low education level 0.42 0.49 367
Secondary level 0.27 0.44 367
University level 0.16 0.37 367
Koranic school 0.15 0.36 367
Home owner 0.56 0.50 367
Mouride 0.45 0.50 367
Wolof ethnic group 0.34 0.47 367
Lebou ethnic group 0.19 0.39 367
Hal Pular ethnic group 0.11 0.32 367
Serere ethnic group 0.23 0.42 367
Diola ethnic group 0.05 0.23 367
Manjack ethnic group 0.01 0.10 367
Bambara, Mandingue and Sub-region ethnic group 0.07 0.26 367
Region of Campus 0.11 0.32 367
Region of Fass, Medina and Geule tapée 0.11 0.31 367
Region of Guédiawaye 0.36 0.48 367
Region of Sandaga 0.12 0.33 367
Region of Kayar, Thiaroye, Yarakh and Yo¤ 0.30 0.46 367
Notes : Prices are in Fcfa. 1 Euro= 656.56 Fcfa.
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Table 3.2. Probabilities of success and willingness to pay a smuggler of
potential illegal migrants
Mean Sd Obs
How much are you willing to pay if p = 1? 1 480 556 2 004 192 145
If p = 0.75, are you willing to migrate? 0.85 0.36 145
If yes, how much are you willing to pay? 1 351 829 1 952 752 123
If p = 0.50, are you willing to migrate? 0.77 0.43 145
If yes, how much are you willing to pay? 1 311 261 1 994 398 111
If p= 0.25, are you willing to migrate? 0.62 0.49 145
If yes, how much are you willing to pay ? 1 315 611 1 792 507 90
If p = 0.05, are you willing to migrate? 0.53 0.50 145
If yes, how much are you willing to pay? 1 264 200 1 592 063 75
Note: 1 Euro=656.56 Fcfa
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Table 3.3. Preferences and willingness to pay a smuggler: Heckman procedure
Variables Selection Outcome Selection Outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average discount rate 0.081***
(3.17)
Risk aversion -1.052***
(2.94)
Log lump sum payment -0.010 0.151***
(0.18) (3.19)
Log expected foreign wage per capita 0.162* 0.185** 0.200** 0.187**
(1.85) (2.10) (2.15) (2.05)
Log wage per capita -0.026 -0.006 -0.000 -0.139
(0.19) (0.05) (0.00) (1.15)
Tightening of immigration policies 0.589*** -0.780*** 0.543** -0.600**
(2.72) (3.10) (2.31) (2.33)
Relatives 0.565** 0.041 0.412 0.219
(2.12) (0.13) (1.43) (0.76)
Migration prices -1.008*** 0.287 -1.031*** 0.196
(8.75) (1.13) (8.27) (0.72)
Education level
Secondary level -0.141 -0.203
(0.63) (0.82)
University level -1.428*** -1.211**
(2.88) (2.17)
Koranic school -0.234 -0.187
(0.81) (0.60)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.403 -0.278
(0.80) (0.51)
Observations 332 280
Notes : Robust z-statistics in parentheses: * signicant at 10%;** signicant at 5%; *** signicant
at 1%. The reference category of the education level is low level. Individual characteristics include
the gender, the age, a dummy equal to one if the individual has a male child dependent, a dummy
equal to one if the individual or his family lives in their own house, religious and ethnic dummies.
Estimations also include region dummies. Full estimations are available upon request.
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Figure 3.1. Individuals discount rate
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to (3.8) yields:
dC
d

1 (1+)t T

 =   u (w)  u (w)
  [u0(w)  Cu00(w)]| {z }
<0
> 0;
dC
dw
=  
u0 (w) 1 (1+)
t T

  [u0(w)  Cu00(w)]| {z }
<0
> 0;
dC
dw
=  
 u0 (w) 1 (1+)
t T

 
h
u00(w)C   C
2
2
u000(w)
i
  [u0(w)  Cu00(w)]| {z }
<0
7 0;
dC
d

 
u00(w)
u0(w)
 =    u0(w)C22
  [u0(w)  Cu00(w)]| {z }
<0
< 0: [QED]
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider second-order Taylor expansions of the elements of (3.9): u (w   C)  u(w)  
Cu0(w) + C
2
2
u00(w); u (w) = u (w +w)  u(w) +wu0(w) + w
2
2
u00(w), u (w +D) 
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u(w) +Du0(w) + D
2
2
u00(w). Substitution into (3.9) then yields:
0 = u(w)  Cju
0(w) +
C2j
2
u00(w)| {z }
u(w Cj)
+
2
6664pj

u(w) + wu0(w) +
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775 :
Dividing by u0(w) and letting A(w) =  u
00(w)
u0(w)
allows one to simplify this expression to:
(3.12) 0 =  Cj  
C2j
2
A(w) + pjw


1 
w
2
A(w)

1  (1 + )t T

 

D  
D2
2
A(w)

:
Now this indi¤erence relationship holds for any gamble .(Cj; pj). It follows, for gambles
(Cj; pj) and (Ck; pk), that  Cj  
C2j
2
A(w) + pjw


1  w

2
A(w)

1 (1+)t T

=  Ck  
C2
k
2
A(w) + pkw


1  w

2
A(w)

1 (1+)t T

, and thus that:
(3.13) 0 = Cj Ck+

C2j
2
 
C2k
2

A(w)+(pk   pj)w


1 
w
2
A(w)

1  (1 + )t T

:
Combining equations (3.12) and (3.13) then allows one to solve for the discount rate 
and the coe¢cient of absolute risk-aversion A(w) as given in the Proposition. [QED]
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Chapter 4
Migration and credit markets:
Evidence from rural Senegal
4.1. Introduction
Migration plays a crucial role in developing countries. In Africa, migrants are around
30 million i.e. 3% of the population and migrants transfers are estimated at 40 billion
$ in 2010. As in many developing countries, in Senegal, the proportion of formal loans
remains low due to many factors including the lack of guarantee given by borrowers, even
if the development of micronance institutions has improved the penetration of banking
services.1 The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the empirical literature related to the
impact of migrants in the recipient countries in the context of rural credit markets. The
0Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the ASSA meeting in Chicago and the IZA Brown
Bag Seminar in Bonn. I thank Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong and conference participants for useful com-
ments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
1The penetration rates of banking services, including micronance institutions, is estimated to 19%
in 2010 according to the Central Bank of West Africa States
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e¤ect of migration on the recipient countries has above all been studied with regard to
the e¤ect of remittances. It is widely demonstrated that remittances have strong e¤ects
in the recipient countries, above all in Africa, by helping to reduce poverty and inequality
(Gubert et al. 2010), for instance. In developing countries where incomes are often low,
insu¢cient and highly variable, remittances have a stabilizing and smoothing e¤ect on
consumption, insuring the recipient households by strongly responding to negative shocks
(Gubert, 2002; Yang, 2008; Combe and Ebeke, 2011) and reducing household income
volatility (Yang and Choi, 2007; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2011). Using the example
of Guatemala , Adams and Cuecuecha (2010) show, after correcting for selection and
endogeneity issues, that remittances have a positive impact on economic development
through investment in human and physical capital in developing countries. According to
this study, households receiving remittances spend more on education and housing and
less on consumption goods than households that do not receive transfers. Migration and
remittances can then help to deal with credit market imperfections and to relax the credit
constraint (Mesnard, 2004) by increasing investments and developing small enterprises
(Woodru¤ and Zenteno, 2007). In the case of the credit markets, Aggarwal et al., (2011)
show that workers transfers by increasing deposits and credits intermediated by the local
banking sector, contribute to the development of the nancial sector and then have a
positive impact on economic development. Demirgüç-Kunt et al., (2011) conrm this
e¤ect by showing in the case of Mexico that remittances increase the number of branch,
accounts and deposits in the recipient country, which positively a¤ects the depth and
breadth of the banking sector. These authors nd in their study a positive impact of
remittances on the share of credit volume year to GDP. However, this e¤ect is less robust
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to the instrumentation of remittances. In the Sub-Saharan Africa context, Gupta et al.
(2009) nd that remittances improve the nancial development, in origin countries of
migrants by facilitating the access of poor households to the formal nancial markets.
However this positive e¤ect of remittances on the nancial sector is put into perspective
by Brown et al. (2011) who nd a negative relationship between remittances and the
nancial deepening in developing countries. More specically, the e¤ect of remittances
on rural credit markets has been studied by Richter (2008) who analyzes the e¤ect of
potential receipt of remittances on credit demand of rural households in the Mexican state
of Oaxaca and her results suggest that the predicated amount of remittances received
at the household level have a positive e¤ect on credit demand. According to Richter
(2008) and Aggarwal et al. (2011), the e¤ect of remittances on credit markets is à priori
ambiguous. They argue that remittances can not only provide insurance to households
and increase their willingness to participate in the credit markets but they can also reduce
credit demand by relaxing the nancial constraints.
As mentioned in the previous literature, migrants through their transfers can have
an impact on the nancial sector. However, in this chapter we look at the e¤ect of
migrants themselves and not the e¤ect of remittances on credit variables. We assume
that migrants can also inuence the credit markets by being the collateral, the "third
element" or the "element of trust" in the credit contract between the borrower and the
lender because they represent a potential solution and can play an insurance role in case
of non repayment. Therefore, we are interested in the relationship between having a
migrant in a household and the likelihood for a household to have a loan and on the size
of the loan. We are going to answer the question "How do migrants a¤ect rural credit
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markets in an African context?". However, we suspect an endogeneity issue of migration
variable due to the potential reverse causality between loans taken by households and the
likelihood of having a migrant in a household. If having a migrant in a household can
explain the likelihood of having a loan and the loan size, loans can allow the nancing of
the migration of one or many household members. To correct for the potential reverse
causality, we choose to instrument the variable having a migrant in a household with a
dummy variable equal to one if there is a mobile phone in the household. Recent literature
shows how mobile phones can inuence migration by giving information about the job
opportunities in the destination countries (Aker et al., 2011). We argue that the variable
mobile phone is exogenous and not correlated to the error term because mobile phones are
widely present in Senegal, even in rural areas, their costs have greatly decreased, they are
easily lost or stolen and thus cannot be considered as a durable asset used to guarantee a
loan.
Data are provided by a program of impact evaluation of multifunctional platforms
which allow access to energy in rural areas in Senegal. The survey includes two waves
and the rst wave was made between June and July 2009 in villages with and without
platforms. In this chapter we use the survey data of the rst stage to realize a cross-section
analysis. After controlling for potential endogeneity issue, results show that having a
migrant in a household increases both the likelihood for an individual to have a loan in
a household and the loan size whether the loan is formal or informal. We also nd that
this positive e¤ect remains signicant if the loan is taken for professional activities or for
food consumption reasons.
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The chapter is organized as follows: the next section presents the conceptual frame-
work. In Section 4.3, we present data and descriptive statistics. The empirical strategy
is given in Section 4.4 while the results are discussed in section 4.5. Concluding remarks
are provided in the last section.
4.2. Conceptual framework
First of all, we assume that having a migrant in a household can increase the likelihood
of getting a loan and the loan size. As shown in the previous literature, migrants through
their remittances play an insurance role against shocks. According to Udry (1994), in the
context of rural areas, borrowers who receive negative shocks are more likely to default.
Moreover repayments can depend on random production and consumption shocks which
a¤ect borrowers and lenders. In these two cases, we consider that migrants who are, by
denition not present in the community, are able to be considered as collateral in case of
non repayment due precisely to these shocks. Therefore, the credit contract includes the
borrower, the lender and the migrant. It seems to us that the role of trust of migrants
is explained by the level of information asymmetry between the borrower and the lender.
Indeed, if we consider that information asymmetries are low in rural areas and major
part of loans are informal (Udry, 1994, 1990), lenders know that, whether a borrower has
migrants in his household and it is very likely that they also know the characteristics
of these migrants such as their gender, age or the destination location. Migrants play a
"psychological" role on the level of trust of lenders. However, we want to go beyond the
role of migrants as those who send money in case of tension on the incomes of the house-
holds members. Even if they do not transfer at all or do not transfer on a regular basis,
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we assume that migrants presence in the household is a sort of signal of the reliability of
borrowers because they constitute a potential solution in case of non repayment.
Second, risk sharing in the same community is made complicated when households
have to face covariate shocks. According to Conning and Udry, 2007), this increases the
willingness to make arrangements outside the community and in these cases, rural credit
markets are able to be fragmented and imperfect due to the high diversity of borrowers.
Therefore, lenders that do not necessarily belong to the close network of borrowers, have
to deal with high information asymmetries. Indeed, they cannot check the reliability of
the borrowers which increases costs of the loans. On the one hand, migrants through
their remittances can make borrowers more reliable allowing them an easier access to
credit. We also expect that migrants play an insurance role with lenders and increase
the likelihood of having a loan and the loan size. In a word, even with high information
asymmetry, migrants would positively inuence the likelihood of getting a loan and the
loan size.
However on the other hand, credit suppliers and migrants can both play an insurance
role and by this way can be considered as substitutes. If the substitutability exists, we
would expect a negative relationship between credit and migration variables. Shocks
make access to the credit market more di¢cult by increasing the interest rate or by
weakening solidarity mechanisms in the community where all households are a¤ected by
the same shocks (Yang and Choi, 2007). Fafchamps and Lund (2003), show that gifts and
informal loans are highly correlated with negative shocks and small networks and relatives
represent the primary source of help for rural household which have to deal with shocks.
For instance, Rozensweig (1988) compares the role of credit and inter-household income
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transfers in smoothing consumption ex post and he shows that inter-household transfers
can substitute for credit arrangements and show that family transfers, over space and
over time, are preferred to credit arrangements above all if credit supply is limited due to
an under-performing local economy.
The purpose of the empirical part is then to test these assumptions and look at
the sense of the relationship between credit and migration variables.
4.3. Data and Descriptive statistics
4.3.1. Data
Data are provided by a household survey conducted in eight regions of Senegal.2 The
survey was part of the program evaluation of multifunctional platform which is an ini-
tiative of the UNDP that allos electrication if rural areas.3 The survey includes two
waves: the baseline survey was made between May and July 2009 and we use data from
this rst wave to realize a cross-section study. The survey was made in villages with and
without platforms4. The sample consists of 161 villages. Villages were randomly selected
according to the criterion of not having access to energy. Villages non treated by the
program and which are the counterfactual villages were selected on their likelihood of
receiving the multifunctional program by 2011 by using matching method: each village
treated and selected to be included in the sample is associated with villages not treated by
2The regions are Kaolack, Fatick, Diourbel, Tambacounda, Kedougou, Kolda, Thies and Louga.
3The survey was jointly conducted by CERDI (Clermont-Ferrand, France), Graduate Institute
(Geneva, Switzerland) and Université Gaston Berger ( Saint-Louis, Senegal).
4The sample groups together villages which received the program in 2009 i.e. villages with MP in
2009; villages which did not receive the program in 2009 but which will received it in 2011 and villages
which did not receive the program neither in 2009, nor in 2011.
143
the program on the basis of similar characteristics. Within the villages, households were
also selected randomly from the list of resident households in the village supplied by the
head of the village5. The sample is representative for rural Senegal in which subsistence
agriculture is the main sector that allows generating income.
4.3.2. Descriptive Statistics
Households are the unit of observation. For variables used in this study, information
about all the household members is provided by one respondent. This respondent may be
the head of the household or his spouse. The credit section of the questionnaire refers to
all the household members who are more than 15 years old at the moment of the survey.
This section tells us if there are any members of the household currently with a loan. If
this is the case and if the respondent has the information, he gives the identication of the
individual who gets the loan, the loan size, the origin and the reasons of loans. Migration
data are supplied in the same way: the respondent reports if there are any migrants in
the household or not. If yes and if it is possible, he gives information about each migrant
in the household, such as his gender, his age, his destination location, the frequency of
remittances and how much he remits to the household each time.
[Table 4.1 HERE]
[Table 4.2 HERE]
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics. On 1769 households, 686 have at least one
migrant in their household whereas 1083 households have none. 85% of migrants are
5The list of household supplied by the village head is based on payments of rural tax. The number
of households present in the list were divided by 12 and a number between one and the number obtained
was chosen, until getting twelve households.
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male and their average age is 27 years old. Internal migrants which means migrants
in Senegal represent 61% of total migrants; migrants to the Northern countries such as
the U.S., France, Spain, Italy and other countries represent 30% whereas migrants to
African countries are only 6%. This high rate of international migrants to Northern
countries can be explained by the fact that the survey was also conducted in regions
such as Louga where there is a lot of migration toward these countries. 73% of migrants
have an occupation. In the case of the credit variables, 41 % of households have at least
individual with a loan, 44% of households with a migrant have a loan versus 38% of
households without a migrant. In our case, formal loans represent 34% and include loans
from commercial banks, mutualist banks, micronance institutions and village funds.
Informal loans represent 66% of loans and are composed of loans from the employer,
the family members, outside the family, "tontines", community stores and the category
"other". Formal loans are smaller than informal loans, as nd in the literature (Fafchamps
and Lund, 2003; Udry, 1994), but they are not as low as one may expect. This may be
due to the increasing presence of banking services such as microcredit. Table 4.2 shows
the descriptive statistics of the credit variables. The average loan size is estimated at 124
910 Fcfa i.e. 190.25 Euro. The average formal loan size is equal to 48 140 Fcfa i.e. 73.32
Euro and the average informal loan size is equal to 76 760 Fcfa i.e. 116.91 Euro. The
informal loan size is higher than the formal loan probably because there are more di¤erent
origins for informal loan size than for formal loan size which is more expensive due to the
interest rate. 58% of loans are taken for food consumption reasons, which represent more
than the half of loans, whereas 27% of loans are used for beginning an activity or for
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buying equipment for professional reasons. In the next section, we present the empirical
strategy used to test the relation between migration and credit markets.
4.4. Empirical strategy
The aim of the empirical part is to study the e¤ect of having a migrant in a household
on the likelihood of an individual getting a loan and on the size of loan received. We use
OLS and Tobit models as estimation methods. In addition to these methods, we also use
the instrumental variable approach.
4.4.1. Identication strategy
In this part, we are interested in the impact of migrants on credit markets. The rst
objective is to estimate the impact of migrants on the likelihood of an individual getting
a loan. The empirical approach is based on a OLS model. The specication is given by:
(4.1) Cij = Bmigranti + CXij + DZj + Fij
Where: Cij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household i in the village j gets
a loan and 0 otherwise. migranti is the variable of interest. It is a dummy equal to
1 if the household i in the village j gets a migrant in his household and 0 otherwise.
B is the parameter to estimate. Xij is a vector of control variables which include the
household head and the household characteristics that can inuence both migration and
the likelihood of getting a loan. The household head characteristics are the gender, the
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age, a dummy equal to 1 if the household head is literate. We do not have detailed
information about the education level of adults. Therefore we use as proxy the variable
literacy. It measures if he has at least an entry-level of education. We also control for
his marital status by making the di¤erence between single, monogamous and polygamous
status of the household head. We assume that being polygamous, can a¤ect migration
and the credit variables. This is because polygamous households have more members,
thus migration is less costly for them because it allows stream diversication of income
(Gubert et al., 2010). We add another factor of explanation which is that there is often
some competition and jealousy between di¤erent spouses and children who do not have
the same mother. In Senegal, a migrant is often seen as someone who has succeeded.
If there is not yet a migrant in the household, or even if there is one migrant in the
household, this can involve the willingness of spouses to encourage the other sons to
migrate. Being polygamous can also inuence the likelihood of getting a loan and the
loan size due to the supplementary expenses that this situation involves. The household
characteristics include the ethnic dummies. We consider that belonging to Wolof, Pular,
Soninke and Mandingue ethnic groups can both inuence migration behavior and credit.
Wolof is the biggest ethnic group in Senegal. Many people coming from the Pular ethnic
group often have livestock holdings which are an indicator of wealth. Soninke people
have a long tradition of migration and big migrant networks in France, Europe and the
USA (Azam and Gubert, 2005). Soninke and Mandingue are also present in most West
African countries and are often traders. We control for the number of people in the
household depending on their gender and their age and for the number of literate people
in the household. Since we do not have information about the income and expenditure
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of the household, we use the durable assets, the livestock and the areas of Farmland to
assess the wealth of households. The value of durable assets is estimated through the
value of goods such as furniture, cars or televisions for each household. The variable
"livestock" measures for each household, the value of livestock composed of animals such
as cows, sheeps or horses in the household.6 Farmland measures the total areas in hectares
cultivated by the household. We control for a dummy equal to one if there are negative
covariate and idiosyncratic shocks which can highly inuence both migration and credit.
Indeed, a household can decide to respond to these shocks by deciding to let of one their
member migrate or thanks to loans. C is the parameter to estimate.
Zj stands for the variable Platform, which is a village characteristic. Platform is a
dummy taking into account if the household is in a village receiving the multifunctional
platform program. Fij is the disturbance term.
Finally, we use clusters to control for village heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity
at the village level can be due to infrastructural di¤erences and social environments which
can inuence the availability of information in villages (Udry, 1994) or performance of the
village economy that can a¤ect the credit markets (Rosenzweig, 1988).
6The common method used to estimate the value of assets and wealth is to use the principal component
analysis. However, since we are interested in credit markets, it seems to us that is more relevant to use the
asset liquidation value. Indeed, it is this value which will be considered by lenders or used as guarantee
by borrowers and the principal component analysis does not tell us anything about the real value of these
assets. Therefore, to obtain the liquidation value, we called some people living in rural areas in Senegal,
more precisely in the region of Louga, one of the surveyed regions, and we asked them to take some
information in the village market on the prices of di¤erent elements present in the variable livestock
and on the new and second-hand prices of durable assets. We chose to use the second-hand prices of
goods since these take wear and tear into account and we consider that, in case of non repayment, lenders
could impound them and resell them at these prices. We multiply the number of durable assets by the
average second-hand prices of these goods. We do the same thing for the livestock by using the prices on
the market.
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The second approach consists of studying the e¤ect of having a migrant on the loan
size. In this part, we consider that the loan size is equal to zero for people that do not
get a loan and is higher than 0 for those with loans. Since we have a large proportion of
zero, we use a Tobit model to estimate the equation of the loan size (Greene, 2008). The
specication of the Tobit model is given by:
(4.2) yij = Bmigranti + CXij + DZj + Fi
yij = 0 if y

ij  0
yij = y

ij if y

ij > 0
and Fi s N(0; 
2)
yij is the probability of having a loan or not and yij stands for the loan size. y

ij
depends on the variable migrant and other factors of inuence presented above.
4.4.2. Endogeneity issue and instrumental variable
We suspect the endogeneity of the variable migrant due to the potential reverse causation
between credit variables and the fact of having a migrant in a household. If having a
migrant in a household can explain loan access, credit can nance the migration of one
or many household members. Thus, to avoid a potential reverse causation, we use as
instrumental variable for migrant a dummy equal to one if there is a mobile phone in
the household. In a recent literature, it is shown that mobile phones improve access to
information which has a positive e¤ect on economic development in Africa through, for
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instance, the reduction of communication costs related to travel in agriculture markets
(Aker, 2010). They also contribute to increase market e¢ciency or job creation (Aker and
Mbiti, 2010). Furthermore, mobile phones are a "democratic" mean of communication
more accessible to the less educated or to people in rural areas. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
has made much progress in the mobile phones eld. For instance, 60% of the Sub-Saharan
African population can get a signal and African villages are quite well covered (Aker and
Mbiti, 2010). According to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU)7, 40% of
rural areas were covered by a signal in SSA in 2006 and mobile phones have made a good
penetration in African markets. There are few economic studies on the impact of mobile
phones on social networks. However, some research shows that mobile phones facilitate
communication among social network within the country and abroad in the case of shocks.
Bloomenstock et al. (2011), for instance, from the example of a natural disaster such as
an earthquake in Rwanda, show how mobile phones via airtime transfers can help to
share risk over the distance and deal with covariate shocks. Aker et al. (2011) suggest
that mobile phones have an e¤ect on rural households and more specically on internal
migration in Niger. They nd that access to and learning how to use a mobile phone,
a¤ect the probability of migration by increasing information on job market opportunities.
Mobile phones allow students to communicate more with migrants in Niger and then a¤ect
labor mobility. We argue that the variable mobile phone is exogenous and not correlated
to the error term. The reasons of this assupmtion are various. In Senegal, about 70%
of the population have access to mobile phones and the number of lines is high as a
proportion of the population (Chéneau-Loquay, 2001). There is a good communications
7www.intu.int
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network and competition on the telecommunications market with some new operators,
allow a larger coverage of the national territory and a great reduction in prices. In a
word, since mobile phones are widely present in Senegal, even in rural areas, their costs
have greatly decreased, they are easily lost or stolen, thus we assume that they cannot be
used to guarantee a loan.
4.5. Results
4.5.1. The e¤ect of migrants on the likelihood of getting a loan
[Table 4.3 HERE]
[Table 4.4 HERE]
Estimates of equation (4.1) are presented in Table 4.3. Columns 1 and 2 present
results of the estimates with the variables migrant which is statistically signicant at 5%
and positive. Columns 3 and 4 present results of the estimates with migrant characteristics
such as gender, age, destination of the migrant, a dummy equal to one if the migrant has
an occupation. In order to control for the selection issue for households which do not have
migrants, we also add the hazard rate computed from the probit explaining the likelihood
of having a migrant (see Appendix). Only the variable gender of migrant is signicant
at 1% and negative. It means that having a male as migrant decreases the likelihood
of getting a loan instead of having a migrant who is female. This result suggests that
female migrants may be more reliable to the borrowers than male migrants. Table 4.4
presents the e¤ect of migrants on the likelihood of getting a loan using the instrumental
variable approach and more specically the two-stage least squares. It also presents the
relationship between having a migrant and the likelihood of getting a loan for professional
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reasons or for food consumption. The instrument mobile phone is statistically signicant
at 1% level and positive. This result supports the ndings in the literature that, by
enabling a migrant network to remain in contact, a mobile phone increases the likelihood
of migration. The F-statistic of this variable is equal to 10.48 with a p-value of 0.002 which
supports the validity of the instrument. After controlling for potential reverse causality,
the result of the variable migrant (Columns 1 and 2) is signicant at 1% level and positive.
It means that having a migrant in a household increases the likelihood of having a loan
in a household which is consistent with our assumptions that a migrant constitutes a
collateral in the credit contract between borrower and lender and his existence in the
household can increase the trust level of the lender and then the likelihood of getting a
loan. The e¤ect of the variable migrant remains signicant and positive whether the loan
is taken to start an activity, to buy some materials for professionnal reasons (Columns 3
and 4) or for food consumption needs (Columns 5 and 6), even though for the latter the
result is signicant only at a level of 10%.
4.5.2. The e¤ect of migrants on the loan size
[Table 4.5 HERE]
The impact of migrants on the loan size (equation 4.2) is presented in Columns 1 and 2
of Table 4.5 which show the results of Tobit estimates. Before controlling for the potential
reverse causality, the variable migrant is not signicant. However, after controlling for the
potential reverse causality, result of the IVtobit estimates becomes signicant and positive
(Columns 3 and 4). Having a male as household head increases the loan size, whereas the
age of the household head is negatively associated with the likelihood of having a loan.
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Having an older household head often means higher earnings and therefore a lower need
to borrow in the household. Whether the household head is monogamous or polygamous
does not have any e¤ect on the loan size relatively to a single household head. The Pular
and Soninke dummies are signicant at a level of 5% and negative, whereas Mandingue
dummy is signicant at 10% and has also a negative sign. Due to the high proportion
of migrants often present in these ethnic groups, above all for Soninke and Mandingue,
we would expect a positive sign, all the more so the variable migrant is positive. We
have two explanations for this result. One may assume that these groups, with their
large migrant networks (Azam and Gubert, 2005), have many recourses and are able to
be helped by di¤erent relatives belonging to their migrant networks instead of asking for
a loan, which reduces their willingness to borrow. In this case, it seems that migrants
network are preferred to credit contracts. The other possible explanation is to associate
the negative sign of these ethnic dummies to a wealth e¤ect probably due to the fact that
in these ethnic groups people often have a professional activity which could make them
richer. Richer individuals can more easily nance themselves and are less likely to ask for
a loan. Pular, for instance, constitutes a part of Fulanis and their assets such as livestock
holdings, probably allow them to reduce the loan size. Moreover, two wealth indicators
such as the variable livestock and farmlands are negatively related to the loan size though
they are not signicant.
Table 4.6 and 4.7 use IVtobit model and present the results of the e¤ect of having a
migrant in a household on the loan size by making the di¤erence between the formal and
the informal loan size respectively. The variable migrant remains signicant and positive
in both cases. It is signicant at 10% for the formal loan size and at 5% for the informal
153
loan size. The partial e¤ect presented in Column 3 in both tables measures the e¤ect
of the independent variable migrant on the loan size if there are loans in the household.
This probability is both conditional on the independent variables and on the part of the
dependent variable which is not censored (Wooldridge, 2001). Results show that having
a migrant in a household largely increases the formal and the informal loan size. However
the e¤ect is stronger for the informal loan size (signicant at level of 5%) than for the
formal loan size (signicant at level of 10%). Thus, having a migrant increases by 494
320 Fcfa i.e. 495 Euros the formal loan size for all people in a household with a migrant.
This amount is estimated at 474 500 Fcfa i.e. 474 Euros for the informal loan size.
4.6. Concluding remarks
The aim of this chapter is to study the impact of migrants on the likelihood of getting
a loan in a household and on the loan size. Suspecting potential reverse causality bias of
the migration variable, we instrument it by using the presence of a mobile phone in the
household. Our results show a positive relationship between migrant and credit variables.
As a check for robustness, we are interested in the motives for obtaining a loan, and
results show that for professional or food consumptions reasons, having a migrant in a
household increases the likelihood of getting a loan. We also nd that having a migrant
signicantly increases both the formal and the informal loan size received by borrowers.
However, the e¤ect is stronger for the informal than for the formal loan size. These results
support our assumptions that migrants increase the reliability of their familys members
and close relatives back home and insure them to lenders in case of credit contracts.
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Therefore, in terms of implications, it would be interesting to envisage how migrants
can be associated more o¢cially to credit contracts. This may help to nance a more
complete investment for the most vulnerable.
In order to extent the relationship between migration and credit variables, future
research can also assess the e¤ect of remittances on credit markets. In this case, since
loans can take the form of remittances and vice versa, it would be interesting to nd a
way to disentangle remittances and loans.
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Table 4.1. Summary statistics
Migrant HH (N=686) Non-migrant HH (N=1083) Total (N=1769)
Variables Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D
Credit 0.44 0.50 0.38 0.49 0.41 0.49
Migrants characteristics
Male 0.85 0.36 0.85 0.36
Age 27.17 10.75 27.17 10.75
Internal migration 0.61 0.49 0.61 0.49
Destination Africa 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24
Destination Northern coun-
tries
0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46
Occupation 0.73 0.44 0.73 0.44
HH characteristics
HH Head is male 0.95 0.23 0.97 0.16 0.97 0.18
HH Head age 55.49 14.72 50.62 13.77 52.48 14.36
HH Head literate 0.51 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.49 0.50
HH Head single 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.40 0.18 0.38
HH Head monogamous 0.39 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.42 0.49
HH Head polygamous 0.46 0.50 0.37 0.48 0.40 0.49
Wolof 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.50
Pular 0.17 0.37 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.41
Soninke 0.08 0.26 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.22
Mandingue 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22
Number of male>14 2.83 1.99 2.66 1.83 2.7 1.88
Number of female >14 3.27 2.04 2.81 1.78 2.97 1.91
Number of male<14 2.66 2.20 2.45 1.97 2.48 2.04
Number of female<14 2.50 2.09 2.23 1.75 2.3 1.88
Number of literate people 3.25 3.03 2.54 2.78 2.83 2.88
Farmland areas 5.84 8.21 4.97 6.10 5.25 6.9
Durable Assets 461.12 495.20 349.72 464.84 389.98 475.58
Livestock 1085.17 1812.22 952.80 1761.70 974.66 1729.10
Covariate shocks 0.89 0.31 0.90 0.30 0.89 0.31
Idiosyncratic shocks 0.08 0.28 0.04 0.21 0.06 0.24
Mobile phone 0.69 0.46 0.57 0.50 0.61 0.49
Number of mobile phones 1.20 1.51 0.89 1.21 0.98 1.31
Village characteristics
Platform 0.36 0.48 0.30 0.46 0.32 0.47
Notes: Amounts are denominated in thousands of Fcfa. 1 Euro=656.56 FCFA.
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Table 4.2. Summary statistics of credit variables
Variables Mean SD N
Loan for professional activity 0.27 0.45 723
Loan for food consumption 0.58 0.49 723
Loan size 124.91 459.54 691
Formal loan size 48.14 208.09 691
Informal loan size 76.76 417.67 691
Notes: Amounts are denominated in thousands of Fcfa.
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Table 4.3. E¤ect of migrants on the likelihood of getting a loan: OLS estimates
OLS
Dependent variable: Loan
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrant 0.071** (2.36)
Migrant characteristics
Male -0.205*** (3.09)
Age 0.001 (0.22)
Destination Africa 0.023 (0.21)
Destination Northern countries -0.110 (1.33)
Occupation -0.015 (0.21)
Hazard rate -0.646** (2.44)
HH characteristics
HH Head is male 0.003 (0.03) 0.151 (0.86)
HH Head age 0.000 (0.24) -0.006 (1.64)
HH Head literate 0.029 (0.84) -0.037 (0.55)
HH Head monogamous 0.009 (0.19) 0.035 (0.32)
HH Head polygamous 0.004 (0.08) 0.052 (0.43)
Wolof -0.108* (1.97) -0.109 (1.53)
Pular -0.251*** (4.55) -0.241** (2.49)
Soninke -0.269*** (3.06) -0.283** (2.30)
Mandingue -0.180** (2.28) -0.109 (0.69)
Number of male>14 -0.005 (0.52) 0.012 (0.62)
Number of female >14 0.015 (1.29) -0.005 (0.24)
Number of male<14 -0.009 (1.20) 0.003 (0.20)
Number of female<14 0.009 (0.96) 0.004 (0.25)
Number of literate people 0.018*** (2.64) 0.005 (0.42)
Farmland areas -0.006** (2.18) -0.003 (0.61)
Durable Assets 0.000 (0.60) -0.000 (0.78)
Livestock -0.000 (0.66) 0.000 (0.10)
Covariate shocks 0.053 (0.74) -0.402 (1.33)
Idiosyncratic shocks 0.232*** (2.62) -0.406 (1.20)
Village characteristics
Platform 0.021 (0.44) -0.060 (0.89)
Observations 1110 359
R2 0.10 0.16
Notes: Absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses. *signicant at 10%, **signicant at
5%, ***signicant at 1%. The reference category for the destination of the migrant
is internal migration. The reference category for the HH marital status is single. All
estimations include a constant and cluster at the village level. Estimation with the
migrants characteristics is run with bootstrap procedure (1000 replications).
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Table 4.4. E¤ect of migrants on the likelihood of getting a loan: IV approach
2SLS
Loan Loan for job Loan for food
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Migrant 1.796*** (2.68) 0.797*** (2.63) 0.646* (1.74)
HH characteristics
HH Head is male 0.347* (1.67) 0.114 (1.15) 0.211** (2.06)
HH Head age -0.009** (2.10) -0.004* (1.81) -0.003 (1.44)
HH Head literate -0.096 (1.07) -0.040 (0.90) -0.063 (1.46)
HH Head monogamous -0.080 (0.72) 0.002 (0.03) -0.027 (0.46)
HH Head polygamous -0.033 (0.31) 0.038 (0.78) -0.016 (0.27)
Wolof -0.037 (0.41) 0.033 (0.74) -0.045 (0.96)
Pular -0.230** (2.47) -0.061 (1.39) -0.143*** (2.73)
Soninke -0.395** (2.56) -0.106 (1.32) -0.190*** (2.59)
Mandingue -0.307** (2.36) -0.114* (1.66) -0.095 (1.31)
Number of male>14 0.036 (1.34) 0.021* (1.72) 0.009 (0.60)
Number of female >14 -0.014 (0.52) -0.016 (1.38) -0.001 (0.05)
Number of male<14 -0.010 (0.71) -0.007 (0.94) -0.006 (0.76)
Number of female<14 -0.015 (0.76) 0.000 (0.03) -0.005 (0.48)
Number of people literate 0.002 (0.11) -0.008 (1.20) 0.006 (0.85)
Farmland areas -0.006 (1.04) -0.003 (0.99) -0.000 (0.03)
Durable Assets -0.000 (0.25) 0.000 (0.98) -0.000 (0.81)
Livestock -0.000 (0.57) -0.000 (0.38) -0.000 (1.04)
Covariate shocks -0.266 (1.56) -0.145* (1.84) -0.007 (0.07)
Idiosyncratic shocks -0.359 (1.21) -0.209 (1.49) 0.089 (0.54)
Village characteristics
Platform -0.063 (0.78) -0.020 (0.53) -0.038 (0.89)
Independent variables First-stage
Mobile phone 0.099*** (3.25) 0.099*** (3.25) 0.099*** (3.25)
Observations 1110 1110 1110
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08
Wald test of exogeneity
Chi2 (1) 18.29 15.24 03.43
Prob>chi(2) 0.000 0.000 0.066
Weak instrument test
F-statistic 10.48 10.48 10.48
Prob > F 0.002 0.002 0.002
Notes: Absolute robust t-statistics in parentheses. *signicant at 10%, **signi-
cant at 5%, ***signicant at 1%. The reference category for the HH marital status
is single. All estimations include a constant and cluster at the village level.
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Table 4.5. E¤ect of migrants on loan size
Loan size
Tobit IVtobit
Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrant 27.419 (0.90) 1711.425** (2.37)
HH characteristics
HH Head is male 13.072 (0.17) 350.743* (1.68)
HH Head age -1.189 (0.74) -10.585** (2.14)
HH Head literate 20.428 (0.50) -101.691 (1.09)
HH Head monogamous 39.815 (0.65) -72.313 (0.62)
HH Head polygamous 27.339 (0.44) -46.448 (0.40)
Wolof -9.928 (0.20) 49.680 (0.54)
Pular -225.022*** (3.06) -212.719** (1.96)
Soninke -249.188** (2.40) -372.428** (2.23)
Mandingue -115.482 (1.44) -247.021* (1.88)
Number of male>14 8.392 (0.50) 45.783 (1.41)
Number of female >14 1.943 (0.12) -28.364 (0.89)
Number of male<14 -13.589 (1.62) -13.967 (0.96)
Number of female<14 -0.106 (0.01) -21.860 (1.04)
Number of literate people 26.175 (1.52) 14.513 (0.75)
Farmland areas -3.672 (0.86) -4.219 (0.68)
Durable Assets 0.204 (1.48) 0.165 (1.07)
Livestock -0.006 (0.49) -0.011 (0.44)
Covariate shocks 114.272 (0.97) -220.014 (1.14)
Idiosyncratic shocks 337.365 (1.59) -271.251 (0.82)
Village characteristics
Platform -11.104 (0.22) -103.545 (1.12)
Independent variables First-stage
Mobile phone 0.101*** (3.33)
Observations 1083 1083
Uncensored observations 428
Wald test of exogeneity
Chi2 (1) 5.42
Prob>chi(2) 0.02
Notes: Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. *signicant at
10%, **signicant at 5%, ***signicant at 1%. The reference
category for the HH marital status is single. All estimations
include a constant and cluster at the village level.
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Table 4.6. E¤ect of migrants on formal loan size: IVtobit
Formal loan size
Coef. z-stat Partial e¤ect>0
Independent variables (1) (2) (3)
Migrant 1725.229* (1.82) 494.320
HH characteristics
HH Head is male 180.570 (0.69) 41.244
HH Head age -9.216 (1.56) -2.217
HH Head literate 55.512 (0.54) 13.359
HH Head monogamous 128.481 (0.88) 31.008
HH Head polygamous 128.491 (1.00) 31.101
Wolof 83.435 (0.80) 20.166
Pular -347.071** (2.23) -78.140
Soninke -380.593* (1.78) -82.532
Mandingue -321.924 (1.58) -70.836
Number of male>14 45.077 (1.54) 10.842
Number of female >14 -10.064 (0.34) -2.421
Number of male<14 -28.044 (1.53) -6.745
Number of female<14 -3.104 (0.14) -0.747
Number of literate people -28.550 (1.64) -6.867
Farmland areas -4.403 (0.60) -1.059
Durable Assets 0.048 (0.48) 0.012
Livestock 0.012 (0.44) 0.003
Covariate shocks -305.269 (1.25) -79.501
Idiosyncratic shocks -533.163 (1.34) -111.707
Village characteristics
Platform -25.357 (0.25) -6.082
Independent variables First-stage
Mobile phone 0.101***
Observations 1083
Uncensored observations 145
Wald test of exogeneity
Chi2 (1) 3.29
Prob>chi(2) 0.07
Notes: Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. *signicant at
10%, **signicant at 5%, ***signicant at 1%. The reference
category for the HH marital status is single. All estimations
include a constant and cluster at the village level.
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Table 4.7. E¤ect of migrants on informal loan size: IVtobit
Informal loan size
Coef. z-stat Partial e¤ect>0
Independent variables (1) (2) (3)
Migrant 1509.638** (2.07) 474.500
HH characteristics
HH Head is male 383.850* (1.88) 90.803
HH Head age -9.357* (1.78) -2.494
HH Head literate -175.020 (1.59) -46.599
HH Head monogamous -197.462 (1.56) -52.403
HH Head polygamous -146.567 (1.20) -38.791
Wolof -25.452 (0.31) -6.774
Pular -149.573 (1.50) -38.610
Soninke -303.590* (1.87) -73.816
Mandingue -205.036 (1.58) -51.304
Number of male>14 40.468 (1.18) 10.788
Number of female >14 -31.093 (0.96) -8.289
Number of male<14 -6.192 (0.46) -1.651
Number of female<14 -21.906 (1.06) -5.840
Number of literate people 31.873 (1.35) 8.496
Farmland areas -3.637 (0.70) -0.969
Durable Assets 0.143 (0.92) 0.038
Livestock -0.018 (0.87) -0.005
Covariate shocks -131.391 (0.68) -36.359
Idiosyncratic shocks -92.948 (0.29) -24.102
Village characteristics
Platform -138.404 (1.38) -36.290
Independent variables
Mobile phone 0.101*** (3.33)
Observations 1083
Uncensored observations 313
Wald test of exogeneity
Chi2 (1) 4.02
Prob>chi(2) 0.04
Notes: Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. *signicant at
10%, **signicant at 5%, ***signicant at 1%. The reference
category for the HH marital status is single. All estimations
include a constant and cluster at the village level.
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Appendix
A. Probit estimate of the likelihood of having a loan in a household
Coef. z-stat
Independent variables (1) (2)
HH characteristics
HH Head is male -0.601*** (2.91)
HH Head age 0.015*** (5.33)
HH Head literate 0.150 (1.59)
HH Head monogamous 0.138 (0.93)
HH Head polygamous 0.094 (0.64)
Wolof -0.146 (1.29)
Pular -0.028 (0.22)
Soninke 0.289 (1.42)
Mandingue 0.247 (1.38)
Number of male>14 -0.070** (2.30)
Number of female >14 0.047* (1.69)
Number of male<14 0.005 (0.26)
Number of female<14 0.018 (0.84)
Number of literate people 0.024 (1.43)
Farmland areas 0.002 (0.23)
Durable Assets 0.000 (0.45)
Livestock 0.000 (0.92)
Covariate shocks 0.629** (2.43)
Idiosyncratic shocks 1.080*** (3.44)
Mobile phone 0.328*** (3.81)
Village characteristics
Platform 0.110 (1.16)
Observations 1182
Pseudo-R2 0.07
Notes: Absolute robust z-statistics in parentheses. *signicant at 10%, **signicant
at 5%, ***signicant at 1%. All regressions include a constant and cluster at the
village level.
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General Conclusion
The main purpose of this thesis was to have a better understanding of the relationship
between migration and three major challenges faced by developing countries namely the
environmental issue, the phenomenon of illegal migration and the development of credit
markets. We then ask four main questions: how can natural disasters, mainly due to
climate change, a¤ect migration in developing countries? How are the intentions of people
formed regarding the decision to migrate illegally in urban Senegal? How do individual
preferences a¤ect the willingness to migrate illegally and to pay a smuggler? How can
migrants inuence credit markets in the context of rural Senegal?
In the rst chapter, we found that natural disasters increase the rate of emigration
but we also found some heterogeneity in this e¤ect depending on the type of disaster.
Climatological disasters have only a lagged e¤ect on migration whereas the other types
of disaster have a contemporaneous and lagged positive impact on migration. There
is also some heterogeneity of the e¤ect of natural disasters on migration according to
peoples level of education. Our results show that natural disasters have an e¤ect only
on the migration of people with a high level of education. Furthermore, we found some
di¤erences in migration behavior between highly educated people depending on their
geographical location. Natural disasters mainly due to climate change raise equity issues
for developing countries because they induce the migration of qualied and skilled people
when these countries are at their most vulnerable. Greater e¤orts could be made by both
developing and developed countries in order to reduce environmental degradation above
all in the poorest countries which contribute the least towards this environmental decline
but which su¤er the greatest consequences.
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In the second chapter, our results show that potential illegal migrants are willing to
accept a substantial risk of death. They tend to be young, single and with a low level of
education. We also found a negative relationship between the price of illegal migration
and the willingness to migrate illegally which suggests that the poorest Senegalese people
will not be able to attempt illegal migration. People may base their illegal migration
project on wrong information because we found that biased expectations towards the
popular destination countries increase the likelihood to migrate illegally. Moreover, our
results show that having relatives who have already migrated increase the illegal migration
intention. Migrant networks give an idea of their life abroad that can be accurate, or not so
accurate, and which can increase the desire of potential illegal migrants to leave Senegal.
A tightening of immigration policies for entering host countries deter more legal than
illegal potential migrants which can be interpreted as a pernicious e¤ect. Finally, our
study shows that some destinations such as Spain or Italy are more attractive and more
correlated with the intention to migrate illegally from Senegal than is France, the U.S. or
the United Kingdom. These results imply that in order to reduce illegal migrant ows,
immigration policies have to be more focused on the formation of intentions, which are
the rst step of an illegal migration project.
The third chapter completes the second one by studying the role of time and risk pref-
erences in the intention to migrate illegally and in the willingness to pay a smuggler with
a probability one of success. From a theoretical model, our comparative statistics show
that the likelihood of migrating illegally is an increasing function of the intertemporal
discount rate, an ambiguous function of risk aversion, an increasing function of the ex-
pected foreign wage and a decreasing function of the price of illegal migration. Second, the
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willingness to pay a smuggler for an illegal immigration attempt with probability one of
success is an increasing function of the intertemporal discount rate, a decreasing function
of risk-aversion, an increasing function of the expected foreign wage, and an ambiguous
function of the domestic wage. We tested our theoretical predictions empirically, except
the e¤ect of the intertemporal discount rate and risk aversion on the illegal migration
intention due to the non-availability of the data for potential legal migrants. All other
theoretical predictions are conrmed by the empirical estimations. We also show in the
empirical part that the willingness to pay a smuggler is positively related to the lump
sum payment necessary to induce an individual not to leave Senegal. This result suggests
that potential illegal migrants assign a high monetary value to illegal migration and have
a high utility gap between migrating and remaining in Senegal. Individual preferences
matter and then have to be considered and taken into account in the explanation of illegal
migration.
The last chapter shows that migrants increase the likelihood of getting a loan and the
loan size. We also nd that this positive relationship between migrants and the credit
variables remains signicant whether the loan is taken for professional or food consumption
reasons or whether the loan size received by borrowers comes from formal institutions or
informal channels. However, the e¤ect is stronger for the informal than for the formal
loan size. These results support the idea that migrants make life more stable for their
relatives left behind and insure them to lenders in case of credit contracts. It would be
then interesting to consider the implication of migrants in credit contracts.
